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I. Introduction 
           In 1890, Argentina was the sixth richest country in the world in per capita 
terms. At the beginning of the 20th century, Argentina was a prosperous nation. After 
the Second World War, Argentina was the third richest country in the Americas in per 
capita terms. In 2009 it belongs to the least developed countries and is the 59th 
richest country. What happened? In the last fifty years there have been a large 
number of governments, and they have all tried to solve the main problem: how to 
stabilize inflation? Many economic programs have been launched, orthodox and 
heterodox, but Argentina seems to always fall back to inflation. What impact has it 
had on the society? Why couldn’t any government stop inflation in the long run? And 
what consequences did the policies have on society? We will provide an overview of 
Argentine economic history and then concentrate on inflation and its impact. Thanks 
to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) we will try to determine if there is a long 
term trade-off between inflation and variables that describe society at large. For 
those, we have chosen unemployment, the output gap, the wage share and labor 
productivity. We will show that inflation, unemployment and labor productivity are 
positively correlated, while inflation, the wage share and the output gap are 
negatively correlated.  And we will see that the backward looking component of 
inflation is more important than the forward looking.  We will also show that the 
results are contrary to the one found by Gali and Gertler for developed countries, like 
the USA or Europe. 
             The thesis is organized as follows: First we provide an overview of the 
different variables considered. Then we summarize the economic history of 
Argentina. After that, we will study the NKPC for Argentina with different measures of 
the marginal costs and the effect of the inflation stabilization policies launched by the 
government. Finally, we will compare our results to the rest of the World.  
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2. Main Variables Considered 
We begin by defining the main variables that will be considered in this thesis and 
provide some descriptive statistics to illustrate Argentina’s historical performance.  
2. A. Inflation 
           Inflation is defined as a general rise in the level of prices. This means that for a 
given number of pesos, one can buy fewer goods and services than before. We’ll 
consider inflation as the yearly average growth of consumer prices. Since the end of 
the Second World War there has been practically no time when Argentina did not 
have problems with inflation. Is it suffering from chronic inflation? According to 
Pazos, “Chronic inflation is characterized by high inflation relative to industrial 
countries and by persistent inflation. Unlike hyperinflation, which lasts only months 
and is explosive, chronic inflation may last several decades and is relatively stable”
1. 
Harberger, in 1981 added another condition: the inflation rate must be more than 
20% in a minimum period of years (Calvo, 1994). We will see in the next chapter if this 
was the case for Argentina. 
 
We will later measure inflation as the ratio of difference of the consumer prices in 
period t and period t-1 on prices in period t: 
  =  −   
where π is the inflation rate, p prices and t the time period. Thus, this first equation is 
the difference between prices at one period and prices in the previous period. 
Figure 1 provides a first outlook of the inflation rate since 1945. The overall level is 
hard to distinguish because of the very peaks. Thus in 1977, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 
1989 and 1990, the inflation rate was higher than 200%. The last period corresponds 
to the convertibility period. We will discuss it on the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                      
1
  From Pazos (1992) (in Calvo, 1994), p. 35. 
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Figure 1: Inflation rate (Consumer Price Index), 1945-20092 
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 See Annex 2 
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2. B. Gross Domestic Product and the Output Gap 
             The gross domestic product (GDP) of a country is the market value of all final 
goods and services made within that country in a year. It measures the production of 
an economy and is often used as a measure of economic well-being. Historical data 
on GDP for Argentina is available in many different units and currency making 
comparison difficult. Robert Summers, Alan Heston and Bettina Aten (1991) have 
developed a method to compare GDP time-series among different countries. But in 
order to do so, the GDP’s had to be measured in the same unit. It turned out that 
using exchange rates to convert the GDP from one country to a common unit wasn’t 
accurate because “exchange rates are influenced by factors other than relative 
domestic price levels (…) and are often quite volatile, particularly in the short term”
3
. 
In order to eliminate the price level differences between countries, they took the 
purchasing power parities (PPP’s) as a converter. Prices of identical representative 
goods and services were collected in each participating country. 
             We use data from the Penn World Table Version 6.3. We will study the PPP 
converted GDP measured in chain series. This variable makes use of relative prices 
and is more accurate for intertemporal comparisons: “Its growth rate for any period is 
based upon international prices most closely allied with the period”
4
. The unit will be 
the international dollar in 2005 constant prices, which is a hypothetical international 
currency based on the purchasing power of the US Dollar in 2005. 
Figure 2: GDP Growth (based on GDP in PPP dollars), 1945-19505 
  
                                                      
3
 AUS, 2005, p. 14. 
4
 Summers, 1991, p. 344. 
5
 See Annex 4.a 
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Figure 3: Real GDP per capita (PPP constant international dollars), 1950-20076 
 
             On the first look as Figures 2 and 3, one can observe an overall increase in the 
per capita GDP from 1945 until 2008. However there are two periods with a 
significant decrease: between 1989 and 1991 and after 2001. Again, those 
correspond to the beginning and the end of the convertibility period. 
Figure 4: GDP growth (based on PPP GDP), 1950-20077 
 
 
             Figure 4 shows that there was no stable GDP growth in Argentina after the 
Second World War as the sign of its slope frequently keeps changing. This illustrates 
the Economy in Argentina for this period: unstable. 
                                                      
6
 See Annex 4.b 
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 See Annex 4.a and 4.b 
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13 
           In our statistical analysis we will also make use of the output gap. This is the 
difference between potential and actual output, or how far the GDP is from its most 
efficient level. This is expressed by 	 − 	∗ where 	∗ is the potential output. 
Constructing the measure of the potential output is not clear and there is no unique 
way. We will follow Gali and Gertler8 (1999) and use data on the Hodrick-Prescott 
detrended output level9. As we can see in Figure 5, there were two periods in the 
second half of the twentieth century where the actual GDP was much lower than the 
potential GDP, in 1960 and in 1990. 
Figure 5: Actual versus potential output 
 
 
 
2. C. The fiscal deficit 
            A fiscal deficit appears when a government’s expenditures exceed its revenues. 
In our sources there were many different definitions. It isn’t very clear which sectors 
are included in the fiscal deficit. Several datasets were compared and although the 
numbers are not exactly the same the curves always move in the same direction. It 
was decided to use the definition from Saldanha10 in which the budget deficit is the 
                                                      
8
 Gali, 1999. 
9
 Computed in Eviews. 
10
 Saldanha, 1992. 
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14 
consolidated public sector deficit which includes the central government, local 
governments, State enterprises and other non financial institutions.  
Consider the following equation (G - T) = (S - I) + (M - X), where (G) represents the 
government’s spending, (T) government’s revenue, (S) private savings, (I) domestic 
spending on private investment and public infrastructure, (M) the import of goods 
and services and (X) the exports of goods and services. In this equation (G-T) is the 
fiscal deficit, (S-I) the excess of private savings and (M-X) the current account of the 
balance of payments11 which should imply that there are two ways to finance the 
budget deficit: internal or external debt. The government could either choose to 
increase the domestic debt or to borrow from abroad and therefore increase the 
foreign debt. But there is a third way. When the government needs money to finance 
its deficit, why not printing it itself? Unfortunately, the increase of the money 
creation can lead to an excess of the demand compared to the supply of goods and 
services. In this case, the firms will have the incentive to increase their prices and 
therewith the inflation rate.  And that was the case in Argentina on many occasions 
(Bulacio, 2001; Mussa, 2002). 
             To measure the fiscal deficit we used data from two different sources: From 
1945 to 1961 we used data from Di Tella and Dornbusch,12 while from 1961 to 2004 
we used the data provided by the ministry of the economy.13 One should be cautious 
when considering this latter source of date, since as some newspapers pointed out 
the government had a particular interest to lower the fiscal deficit.14 
             In order to provide some benchmark for the data for Argentina the European 
Union’s legal limit for a fiscal deficit according to the Maastricht criterion is 3% of the 
GDP. As we can see in Figure 6 Argentina wouldn’t have met this criterion for most of 
the second half of the 20th century. 
                                                      
11
 See definition in the exchange rate and current account sections. 
12
 Di Tella, et al., 1989. 
13
 Ministerio de Economia y Producion, Secretaria de Hacienda, 2004. 
14
 Bermúdez, 2009. 
15 
Figure 6: Fiscal deficit as a share of GDP, 1945-200815 
 
 
2. D. Exchange rate and Current account 
              The exchange rate is the rate at which a currency can be converted to another 
currency. It specifies how much one unit of a currency is worth in the unit of the 
other currency. We will use the Peso/Dollar exchange rate, which is the number of 
Argentine currency units one would need in order to purchase one American Dollar. 
When the rate doesn’t take into account inflation differentials between countries, it is 
called the “nominal exchange rate”, as opposed to the real exchange rate, which 
takes into account differences in prices in the two countries. We consider the real 
exchange rate taken at the end of a year. In the case of multiple exchange rates we 
use the average of them all. 
            The balance of payments accounts for all monetary transactions between a 
country and the rest of the world. It is composed of the capital and current account. 
The balance of payments is always balanced but there can be deficit on the current 
account. It “implies an excess of imports over exports of goods, services, investment 
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 See Annex 5 
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16 
income, and unilateral transfers. This leads to an increase in net foreign claims upon 
the home nation”.16 
             There are many different exchange rates systems that have been adopted. 
One possibility is a fixed exchange rate system whereby the currency of one country 
is pegged to another and is not allowed to fluctuate. Alternatively, the exchange rate 
may be allowed to float freely, with the price of the currency responding to changes 
in demand and supply. Between these two extremes there are many different 
systems with differing degrees of currency flexibility. The advantage of a stabilized 
currency is that people may be more keen to invest there is no future risk about the 
exchange rate. In addition, a fixed exchange rate can act as a means of stabilising 
inflation, since any rise in domestic prices would lead to a lack of competitiveness 
both at home and abroad. Since the end of the Second World War there have been 
many attempts to stabilize inflation in Argentine using the exchange rate as an 
anchor. Unfortunately, the use of this instrument can also have negative effects: In 
the case of high inflation a fixed exchange rate makes domestic goods ever more 
uncompetitive. The increase in the price of domestic goods and the lack of a 
compensating change in the exchange rate imply that the country’s products become 
less attractive. The resulting increase in imports and decrease in exports leads to a 
deterioration of the current account. In the case of Argentina however, Frieden and 
Stein (2001) emphasize that the pegging of the Peso to the Dollar wasn’t likely to 
result in a real appreciation and that in any case the inflation stabilization goal was 
more important than real appreciation concerns because of Argentina’s history of 
hyperinflation. We’ll comment on this theory later17. (Frieden and Stein, 2001) 
            Since 1945, Argentina’s government devalued their currency and renamed it 
four times. From 1945 to 1969 the peso was called “Peso Moneda Nacional” (PMN). 
In 1970, it was renamed to “Peso Ley” (PL) with one PL being equal to 100 PMN. In 
1983 the currency changed again to “Peso Argentino” (PA) being worth 10,000 PL. In 
1985 the government decided to change the name of the currency completely and for 
six years people paid in “Australes”, with one Austral being equal to 1000 PA. Since 
                                                      
16
 Carbaugh, 2007. 
17
 See the end of chapter 3.G. 
17 
1992, the currency has simply been called the “Peso” and is worth 10000 Australes.18 
On Figure 7, one can distinguish two peaks for the exchange rate in the 1880’s. The 
second one corresponds to the peaks already observed for inflation and GDP, i.e. 
during the convertibility period. This is also illustrated on Figure 8 where the current 
account starts decreasing very low at the beginning of the 1980’s 
Figure 7: Exchange rate – local currency unit per US dollar19 
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 See Annex 6. 
19
 See Annex 6. 
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Figure 8: Current account balance (millions of US dollars)20 
 
                                                      
20
 See Annex 7. 
-15000
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
1
9
4
5
1
9
4
8
1
9
5
1
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
7
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
8
19 
2. E. Marriage 
             Data on marriages was obtained from the United Nations statistical yearbooks 
from 1948 to 2009. It will be one of the main instrument variables in the statistical 
estimation of the Phillips curve. The variable measures the crude marriage rate, i.e. 
the number of marriages for 1000 persons. Unfortunately there are big gaps in the 
data and it’s difficult to interpret the graph from Figure 9. Still, in the average, it is 
possible to say that the marriage rate decreased in the post-war period. And a small 
increasing can be also distinguished in the 1980’s and at the beginning of the 1990’s.  
 
Figure 9: Crude Marriage rate21 
 
 
2. F. Real wages and the wage share 
             The real wage index was taken from Sommavilla22 for years 1945 to 1980 and 
from the Economic commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) for years 
1980 to 2003. The indices from the two sources have different base years and so the 
second was recalculated in order for them both to have a common base year of 1970. 
It is interesting to notice from Figure 10 that the wage level didn’t improve much 
since the end of the Second World War. It was on an increasing path until the 
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 See Annex 9 
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 Sommavilla, 1996. 
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20 
beginning of the 1970’s. Then it began to be very irregular until the beginning of the 
1990’s. Since then it seems to be rather stable. The convertibility period also had an 
impact on this variable as a peak can be noticed at the end of the 1990’s as well. 
Figure 10: Real wages (1970=100)23 
 
            The wage share is measured as labor compensation divided by GDP and is an 
indicator of the distribution of income between capital and labor. The wage share 
 can thus be written as: 
 =
	 ×  
  
The variable is only defined from 1974 onwards because data on the employment 
rate is only available from 1974 onwards. In much of the literature, the wage share is 
used as a measure of the marginal costs of firms. 
2. G. Unemployment  
             The unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of the active population 
that is unemployed. The data comes from the book of Sommavilla for the years 1963 
to 1971 and from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina from 
1972 until 2009. In Figure 11 one can see that it has been much higher since 1991 
which corresponds to the beginning of the convertibility period. We’ll return to this in 
the next chapter. 
                                                      
23
 See Annex 9. 
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Figure 11: Unemployment rate (1963-2009)23Erreur ! Signet non défini.  
 
 
2. H. Employment and the labor productivity 
           The opposite of the unemployment rate is the employment rate, which 
measures the percentage of the active population in employment. We used data from 
the Argentine government, i.e. the national institute the Argentine National Institute 
of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) to measure the employment rate. Unfortunately, 
we weren’t able to obtain data before 1974. Considering Figure 12 we can see a 
negative trend in the long-run employment rate, with the level of employment having 
declined since 1974. 
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Figure 12: Employment rate (1974-2005)23 
 
            Labor productivity represents the amount of output produced by a worker in a 
certain amount of time, and is a measure of the “efficiency” of the labor force. It is 
measured as 

, where Y is the output and N the employment rate. A high level of 
labor productivity can be associated with higher unemployment: if labor productivity 
increases, firms won’t have a high incentive to hire new workers. 
 
2. I. Inflation stabilization policies 
            In order to stabilize inflation three policies are often used. The first is the use 
of monetary policy, whereby the government manipulates interest rates to control 
demand. Higher interest rates discourage borrowing and increase the rate of saving, 
which decreases aggregate demand and investment. As the demand is lower, the 
price level will fall. The second policy is to manipulate exchange rates. An increase in 
the exchange rate is termed an appreciation of the domestic currency, and makes 
domestic goods more expensive relative to foreign goods. Exports from the domestic 
country thus become more expensive and the demand for goods as well as for 
domestic currency declines. Moreover, imports from abroad become relatively 
cheaper which can lower the production costs and prices of domestic firms. This 
policy is often accompanied by an incomes policy, which means setting a limit on 
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wages. Fixing wage limits the extent of “cost inflation”. The third possible way to stop 
price increasing is to use fiscal policy. The aim here is to again lower the level of 
aggregate demand by reducing the fiscal deficit through increasing taxes and 
reducing public spending. In practice, policies tend not to be implemented separately. 
(Jusué, 2008) 
              We will now concentrate on our country of interest, Argentina. In their article, 
Erica Jusué and Tomas Navarro (2008) listed the different inflation stabilization 
policies that have “successfully” been launched in the country since the end of the 
Second World War. By “successful” the authors mean that these are policies that 
have not been interrupted by political instability or higher inflation. These programs 
are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Targeting variables of inflation stabilization programs24 
Year Fixed 
Exchange 
rate 
devaluation Floating 
exchange 
rate 
Decrease of 
public 
spending 
Tax 
increase 
Interest 
rates 
reduction 
price 
limits 
Wage 
limits 
1952 X    X  X X 
1959 X      X X 
1967 X X   X  X X 
1973 X      X X 
1976 
1979 
 X   X   X 
1985 X    X X X X 
1988  X   X  X X X 
1989 X  X      
1991 X   X X    
2002   X      
total 7 3 2 2 5 2 6 7 
   
          If one takes a look at the total it is clear that Argentina has mostly employed 
exchange rate policies accompanied by controls on prices and wages. In fact, out of 
ten programs the exchange rate was the main anchor in eight of them. On the fiscal 
side, controlling the budget was never the main anchor of policy. In ten programs the 
Argentine authorities tried to reduce the fiscal deficit six times, but in all cases this 
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was a secondary policy. The monetary policy instrument was also not used often 
since the central bank wasn’t independent. In fact monetary policy was used only 
twice. During the Austral plan in 1985 interest rates were targeted, but this policy 
was again only secondary. The only time when monetary policy was the main policy 
was in 1988 and the policy didn’t even last a year. 
            To describe the different policies adopted for our analysis we will construct 
dummy variables that summarize the policies undertaken in different periods of time. 
The first dummy variable we consider is a general dummy, which we call STAB for 
stabilization policy dummy. This is constructed as follows: the variable is set equal to 
1 for the years where stabilization policies were launched and 0 otherwise. The 
second dummy is an exchange rate policy dummy, XRpol, which is equal to 1 when 
the exchange rate was manipulated by the government and 0 otherwise. The third is 
a fiscal policy dummy, FDpol, which is equal to 1 when the fiscal deficit was 
manipulated by the government and 0 otherwise. We also construct similar dummy 
variables for the monetary policy anchor (IRpol) and for price (Pcontrol) and wage 
(Wcontrol) controls with the value of the dummy being 1 when the variable was one 
of the government’s anchors and 0 otherwise.  
25 
3. History of Argentina’s political economy since the Second World 
War 
Argentina has had a complicated and unstable economic history since 1945. There 
have been a large number of governments and many policies have been adopted 
during this period. We want to examine whether there has been a trade-off between 
inflation or inflation policies and parameters that reflect society, such as GDP or 
unemployment, during this period. In this chapter, we will consider the historical 
performance of Argentina and the political and policy changes implemented during 
this period. The vertical circle dashed lines represent the inflation stabilization 
policies. 
3. A. 1945-1955: Peron’s inflationary policy 
Figure 13: CPI, GDP per capita and real wage index 1945-1955 (1945=100) 
 
 
             In Argentina during the Second World War manufacturing imports had 
declined and as a consequence the domestic manufacturing sector had to be 
developed. Juan Domingo Perón became president on the 4th of June 1946 and was 
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re-elected in 1951 until September 1955. He undertook several measures in the 
industrial and agricultural sector as well as in the labor market. In 1945 Argentina’s 
revenue came essentially from agriculture. Its manufacturing sector was producing 
non basic manufactured goods, such as consumer goods and agricultural equipment, 
rather than basic items such as heavy machinery. Argentina wasn’t efficient in the 
industrial sector and had become very dependent on imports of these basic items 
that could only be paid by exporting agricultural items. Perón wanted to support 
industrialization. To encourage this he kept agricultural prices very low in order to sell 
agricultural items at a price below the world price and use the profits made from such 
exports to import capital equipment and intermediate materials. To attain his goal, he 
launched an inflationary policy and introduced a triple fixed exchange rate system. He 
also kept an overvalued exchange rate on capital equipment and intermediate 
materials in order to encourage imports of these items and thereby industrialization, 
a policy widely known as “import-substitution industrialization, (ISI)”25. Peron also 
increased the number of State employees considerably and thereby artificially 
maintained the employment rate high. The first three years of his government were a 
prosperous period with GDP growth being positive as can be observed on Figure 3. 
             The policies adopted had a number of drawbacks. Firstly, prices began to 
climb. According to Yordon, this was because prices were following the exchange 
rates, with the direct consequences being higher agricultural prices and a higher cost 
of living. Labor demanded wage increases to compensate for price increases and an 
inflationary cycle took hold. Yordon argues that the only way to get out of the spiral 
would have been for the workers to accept wage decreases. In addition, public 
spending increased greatly to finance industrialization and public employees. The 
Fiscal deficit grew from 4.6% in 1945 to 13.4% in 1948 as can be observed in Figure 6 
and was financed with foreign and internal loans. A further drawback of this strategy 
was the consequential increase in the trade deficit as the imports were encouraged 
and exports handicapped by the exchange rate. Nevertheless, the ISI strategy was 
used for a long period. One consequence of low agricultural prices was that the 
farmers were confronted with the problem of buying expensive raw materials but 
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selling at cheap prices and therefore couldn’t expand their production. In Figure 13 
we can observed that from 1945 to 1949 prices, wages and GDP seem to move in the 
same direction. Wages and inflation seem correlated for a while. Unemployment is 
not reported in this figure but would be distorted as Perón maintained the 
employment rate high by increasing public labor (Sommavilla, 1996; Bonilla, 1999; 
Yordon, 1965).  
           After 1949 the decline in world prices in the agricultural sector, the stagnation 
of agricultural production and the increase in domestic consumption led to a slowing 
down of agricultural exports. Furthermore, inflation started to be a concern for the 
government. In Figure 14 one can observe that prices started to increase in 1949 and 
never fell back down after that. Anxious, Perón decided to increase domestic 
agricultural prices relative to industrial prices26. As a short term consequence of this 
new policy, the economic situation in 1951 improved: the fiscal deficit decreased to 
4.5% and GDP was growing. Unfortunately the increase in domestic agricultural prices 
was soon followed by a decreasing in international prices. As a result export earnings 
due to low agricultural prices declined and budget cutbacks had to be made in order 
to continue subsidizing manufacturing through imports. But this didn’t stop the 
deficit from increasing or help in reducing inflation. The constant price increases 
included the governments’ up-keep costs, and led to lower purchasing power, which 
decreased business revenues and business tax revenue. Facing diminished tax 
revenue and higher up-keep costs the government had to raise its fiscal deficit. This is 
called the Olivera-Tanzi effect27 and is observed several times in Argentina. From 
1949 until 1952 prices increased a lot while wages decreased. In 1952, the first 
inflation stabilization policy was attempted by Perón but it could not bring inflation 
down for any period of time with inflation increasing again in 1954, as illustrated in 
Figure 13. To sum up the movements of our main variables of interest during Peron’s 
presidency period we can say that there was a negative correlation between prices 
and wages and between prices and GDP (Yordon, 1965; Gerchunoff, 1989). 
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            Peron kept creating non-productive positions in Government and State 
enterprises, which had the effect of increasing the deficit further. Raúl Prebisch an 
Argentine economist and the director of the CEPAL (Comisión Económica para 
América Latina or Economic Commission for Latin America) advised the Government 
to stimulate agriculture by abandoning the multiple-exchange rate, raising 
agricultural prices, reducing government expenditures and increasing investment in 
basic industries. For workers, this meant an increase in the cost of living and the 
removal of the non-productive jobs that Perón had created. And the government 
spending, according to Prebisch, should be financed not by inflation but by foreign 
loans and investments. 
Figure 14:  Prices and wages indices 1948-1961 (1950=100)28 
 
1949 82 80 84 88 85 105
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100
1951 152 137 127 132 161 93
1952 180 190 156 159 210 83
1953 218 197 170 164 218 86
1954 220 205 194 184 216 95
1955 232 230 216 214 241 94
1956 328 261 246 248 392 94
1957 412 325 329 299 434 101
1958 550 428 454 401 532 106
1959 1375 914 771 807 1482 84
1960 1555 1163 905 990 1660 78
1961 1648 1321 1258 1080 1610 95
1962 2270 1694 1587 1380 2140 94
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3. B. 1955-1973: struggle to take some economic measures  
Figure 15:  CPI, GDP per Capita and index of real wage 1956-1965 (1945=100) 
 
             The Government couldn’t proceed with the reforms of Raul Prebisch as the 
people lost trust in them. As the central bank had been nationalized the Government 
had control over it and constantly printed money. This led to more inflation and 
opacity of market behaviour. The cost of living increased sharply. People were more 
and more dissatisfied. The people started to revolt against the Government and, in 
1955, Perón was overthrown. With the arrival of Eugenio Arambru as the new head of 
State conflicts and violence increased. On the economic side, his aim was to increase 
exports. He devalued the exchange rate making Argentina’s exports more 
competitive on world markets. Despite this policy, the trade deficit continued to 
increase largely because of the “adverse international situation in terms of flow of 
Argentine trade”29 and the “quantitative restrictions practised by the countries 
purchasing Argentine products”30.  The devaluation stimulus was offset in 1958 as 
agricultural prices increased by 85% in 1958. The fiscal deficit also reached a peak of 
9.6% (Gerchunoff, 1989; Sommavilla, 1996) 
          In 1958 Arturo Frondizi became president and inherited an economy in bad 
shape. He wanted “to push forward the country’s economic development”,31 a policy 
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known as “desarollista” and had ideas similar to those of Peron. In the first year he 
held his electoral promise of raising wages by 60%. But in 1959 economic pressures 
were high with prices having soared and the country was facing collapse with a GDP 
declining by -6.76%. To stop this descent, Frondizi followed the suggestions of 
Prebisch from 1955. First, he eliminated the workers previously hired by Perón in 
public enterprises that weren’t needed and established a policy of wage restriction. 
The effect of the wage increases in 1958 was offset in 1959 as Figure 15 reveals. 
Second, he raised agricultural prices and eliminated controls on trade to stimulate 
exports. His third measure was to increase fiscal revenues from foreign trade by 
eliminating quantitative controls on foreign trade and letting the exchange rate float 
without changing the public expenditures level. As a result of these measures the 
fiscal deficit was brought down to 2.9% in 1959 and to 2.7% in 1960. Finally, the 
problem of inflation needed to solve in order to receive loans from abroad. To 
achieve this, the second inflation stabilization policy was launched. Figure 15 shows 
that the measures were successful but only in the short term as inflation rose again 
shortly after. Unfortunately, all of the measures undertaken could only bring about 
short-term stabilization. In 1961, the current account was again in deficit. In addition, 
the labor force was again dissatisfied because of the higher cost of living. Wages had 
increased while inflation had decreased but only for a while, with wages declining and 
inflation increasing again after a short time. The major sources of revenue were the 
excise tax – which is charged directly to the producer on each finished item – sales 
taxes, income taxes and import duties and surcharges. Workers paid 15% of their 
incomes in taxes and there was no way to increase public revenues by taxing 
individuals more. Yordon argued that “there was no acceptable easy means of 
increasing taxes”
32. The government was struggling on all sides: from the military 
forces which imposed frequent cabinet changes, the labor unions calling for strikes 
and the inter-services rivalries in the use of force. In March 1962 Frondizi was 
overthrown. This event was followed by a $350 million capital outflow, an increase in 
price and a depreciation of the exchange rate. The populous wanted to return to the 
measures taken by Perón before 1952 and thus to cancel the measures taken by 
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Frondizi. The quick replacement of different governments led to economic insecurity 
and a depreciation of the currency against the dollar. Foreign investors were scared 
by the political instability, while the unions and firms focused more and more on 
short-term interests (Yordon, 1965; Petrecolla, 1989). 
           In 1962, Jose Maria Guido took over the presidency for one year and had many 
different ministers of the economy, making it difficult to have a real long term policy. 
Guido started a liberalization wave and intended to eliminate all exchange controls. In 
this context, he let the peso fluctuate. Furthermore, he reduced foreign trade taxes 
which added to the budget deficit. This was partly financed by issuing bonds that 
were used to pay for wages and public employees were forced to sell those bonds 
back at a discount rate. The budget deficit was also partly financed through domestic 
debt (De Pablo, 1989). 
             In 1963, Arturo Illia became president. He re-authorized the Peronist 
movement. In 1964, he established a minimum wage and a law to control food prices. 
He tried to regulate the public sector and to ameliorate industrialization. His efforts 
can be observed in Figure 4, where we observe an increase in GDP growth from -
4.75% in 1963 to 5.73% in 1964 and 8.08% in 1965.33 This was the longest post-war 
period of positive growth. Illia also managed to bring the fiscal deficit down to 4.72%. 
The world price for argentine exports was high and agricultural production was able 
to expand. Over this short period of time, wages increased along with inflation which 
was often not the case previously and unemployment decreased (Guadagni, 1989). 
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Figure 16: CPI, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and an index of real wages 1965-1973 
(1965=100) 
 
             In 1965, the Peronists with Illia as their head won the legislative elections. But 
in June 1966, the president was overthrown by the military, supported by the unions 
and some politicians. Juan Carlos Ongania took his place and headed the “Revolución 
Argentina”. He devalued the peso by 30%, which was then fixed until 1970. His means 
of controlling inflation was to restrain wage growth and to restrict price increases. 
This policy worked as inflation decreased slightly until 1969 as did wages. 
Unemployment, on the contrary sharply increased. In 1969, beef prices increased 
sharply and inflation returned (Maynard, 1989). 
         Juan Carlos Ongania when he became the new head of the State faced strikes 
and demonstrations. In 1970, the military officers removed him and Roberto Marcelo 
Levingston Laborda became the new president. He was soon followed by Alejandro 
Agustín Lanusse who took over between 1971 and 1973. This period of political high 
instability is reflected in Figure 16. Inflation and unemployment soared and real 
wages decreased. GDP increased for a few years but started to decrease again in 
1972. The authorities did take a number of measures to remedy this situation. 
Between 1970 and 1971, the minister of the economy increased public expenditures 
and decreased the tax on capitalization. Still in 1971, the new minister of the 
economy also launched a public investment policy. As a result the deficit increased to 
4.4% in 1971. At the end of that year, the next minister in this domain tried to 
implement a restrictive policy in order to increase fiscal revenue and reduce the 
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deficit. But the economic situation was poor – see Figure 4 where GDP growth is 
shown to be very low between 1970 and 1973. In 1972 Argentina had to borrow from 
the IMF “under harsh terms”34 to finance its deficit (Mc Comb, 1997, Filippini, 1989). 
To summarize, during this period the relationship between inflation and 
unemployment and inflation and prices were rather mixed. More often during this 
period, prices and wages were negatively correlated and inflation and unemployment 
positively correlated. 
3. C. 1973-1976: the return of Perón and high fiscal deficit 
Figure 17: CPI, GDP per Capita, the unemployment rate and the real wage index from 1973 to 
1976 (1965=100) 
 
            In May 1973, the Peronist candidate Héctor José Cámpora was elected. The 
new government suggested stopping inflation by bringing business and labor unions 
together to make agreements on keeping prices and wages stable. New restrictions 
were imposed on foreign investment. The government gained control of credit and 
prices and even created a value-added tax. Those measures helped decreasing 
inflation in the short-run, but at the same time public sector employment grew, and 
with it public expenditure. This resulted in a larger budget deficit, to which the 
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government responded by creating more money which brought political chaos and 
rising inflation again.  
             Perón returned with a mandate to solve these problems and was elected 
president in September 1973. His policy was based on more public spending and 
therefore he increased the number of State employees as well as their wages. He also 
cancelled tax receipts. In 1973 and 1974, economic growth was high largely because 
of the favourable world economic situation and the positive terms of trade, but the 
negative effects of government intervention appeared quickly. The fiscal deficit grew 
to 7.5% in 1973. This was financed partly by increasing domestic debt, partly by 
creating money and partly by fiscal repression. But such policies couldn’t continue 
indefinitely: inflation was too high and money creation had reached its limit.  
          In June 1974, after the death of Juan Peron, his wife Isabel Peron took over the 
role of President and proceeded to make some drastic changes. Wages and prices 
became more flexible. She tried to launch a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 
which should have reduced inflation and deficit. But the deficit continued to grow 
reaching 13.8% in 1975, which was the highest since the war. In the same year, the 
current account balance turned negative and the peso had to be heavily devalued. 
This marked the beginning of a series of devaluations that started to influence 
economic behaviour. Also inflation couldn’t be stopped by her policy and it soared to 
443.8% in 1976. The economic situation was tense and ministers were replaced often.  
Despite the government having made an agreement with the IMF to reduce its 
deficit, it was overthrown in March 1976 (Mc Comb, 1997; Di Tella, 1989; Bonilla, 
1999). 
Figure 17 illustrates what happened during those three years. First, all four variables 
were moving together and then, approximately at the moment where Peron’s wife 
took over, inflation soared while unemployment, wages and GDP decreased. 
 
35 
3. D. 1976-1983: military governments and dissatisfactions: the “dirty 
war” 
Figure 18: CPI, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and an index of real wages 1976-
1983(1965=100) 
 
             An army commander, Jorge Rafael Videla, became president and took Jose 
Martinez de Hoz as finance minister. The government started an inflation stabilization 
policy. The policy seemed to work as, in 1977, the inflation rate decreased to 176%. 
After that, Argentina financed its deficit more and more by borrowing from abroad 
and less by creating money. In 1977 and 1978, the positive effect of devaluations 
could be observed as the terms of trade turned positive. Unfortunately, it was the last 
time until 1990 that it was above zero. Moreover, the “permanent reliance on foreign 
finance of the deficit”35 was growing. And even though the inflation rate had 
decreased, it was still higher than 100%. In 1978 the Government was facing a new 
crisis. Videla answered by launching, in 1979, for two years an inflation stabilization 
program based on the exchange rate: a variant of crawling peg called “tablita”, in 
which the exchange rate is adjusted periodically according to a set of indicators. The 
principle of such a table was to pre-announce devaluations for the next eight months 
which would adapt to inflation and wages. From the beginning of this program the 
devaluation rate was set below inflation and led to a huge increase in the exchange 
rate from 1003.5 pesos per dollars in 1978 to 48545 in 1982. This peak is shown in 
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Figure 7. Inflation decreased slightly. Videla also decided to launch a foreign trade 
liberalization policy. He thought declining import price inflation would help to reduce 
domestic market price inflation but it wasn’t successful. The system collapsed in 1981 
as the devaluation deviated from the schedule and prices grew again. The 
government tried to initiate a dual exchange rate system but in the same year it was 
abandoned to let the peso float. The economic situation was bad. Foreign debt had 
grown from $9.7 billion in 1977 to $35.7 billion in 1981. GDP growth dropped to its 
lowest point of -6.6%. The exchange rate based plan was not compatible with fiscal 
restrictive policy and therefore, the deficit rose to 6.5% in 1980 and 11.3% in 1981 
(Sjaastad, 1989; Dornbusch, 1990; Dornbusch, 1984). 
           Meanwhile a huge financial crisis was taking place in which many people were 
affected. In 1977 the national bank declared it would insure all deposits. The people 
could place their money in any institution that offered the best interest rate without 
incurring any risk. A lot of insecure financial institutions opened at that time. With 
this kind of insurance the banks and the financial institutions could make risky 
investments. Problems began to appear in 1978 as the Government decided not to 
backup 100% of the investments but only $650 for domestic currency deposits, 90% 
for larger deposits in domestic currency and nothing for deposits in dollars. People 
started to withdraw their money as they were not sure about the solvency of the 
financial institutions. In March 1980 the largest banks and financial institutions could 
not honour withdrawals of the deposits. Three of the major banks had to close. The 
central bank had to liquidate those institutions and became responsible for at least 
90% of the deposits. This led to a huge monetary expansion. The central bank decided 
to revert to covering 100% of the deposits up to $56000, which could be applied 
retroactively and to dollars as well. But deposits in private national banks dropped 
greatly. At the beginning of 1981, the country was nearly out of international reserves 
(Mc Comb, 1997). 
             Incapable of dealing with the catastrophic situation three presidents followed 
each other from 1981 to 1983. Inflation continued to grow, foreign debt increased by 
$26 billion and the national part of it increased by 20 percentage points. As a 
consequence, the deficit stayed above 10% during those three years. The measures 
37 
taken were quite limited because of political instability. The central bank tried to 
compensate the continually devalued peso by providing insurance on foreign loans to 
private sectors firms. But the exchange rate kept depreciating and by 1982, it was 
unable to honour this insurance. In order to prevent capital flight the Government 
decided to offer financial institutions bonds up to the same value as the loans they 
refinanced. The central bank ended up owning several bankrupt firms and faced a big 
fiscal deficit. The Government then attempted to put a limit on interest rates and 
improve exchange rate insurance but investors continued to turn away from the 
Argentine capital market. In December, Leopoldo Galtieri took over. He wanted to 
return to a liberalization policy. But in 1982 Argentina and the United Kingdom 
engaged in the Falklands war. Argentina’s expenses were very high and the military 
defeat led to Galtieri's resignation. Between 1976 and 1983 at least 10,000 people 
“disappeared” in the so-called “dirty war”. People asked more and more questions 
and wanted a return to civilian rule (Dornbusch, 1984, 1990; Mc Comb, 1997). 
38 
 
3. E. 1983-1989: very large inflation rates, Alfonsin and the Austral plan 
Figure 19: CPI, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and an index of real wages 1983 to 
1989 (1965=100)36 
 
             In October 1983 a human rights activist, Dr. Raúl Alfonsin, was elected. By 
then the Argentine economy was in a really bad shape. Debt levels were huge and 
nothing seemed to be able to stop inflation. Alfonsin managed to bring the budget 
deficit down to 5% in 1985 and to increase GDP growth, but he also financed the 
deficit by increasing the seignorage level, i.e. by printing money. In addition to that, 
the currency depreciated against the dollar. For these two reasons he didn’t succeed 
in giving an attractive picture of his country to foreign investors. This led to a new 
financial crisis. The central bank had to stop deposits in dollars for 180 days. “The 
flight out of the domestic currency and into goods and dollars”37 led to an increase in 
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the general price level and pushed the monthly inflation rate above 30% in May 1985 
(Mc Comb, 1997).  
             In June 1985 the government decided to adopt a heterodox stabilization plan, 
the Austral plan, described by Kiguel as “the basic strategy […] attempted to provide a 
comprehensive response to the large existing imbalances in public finances and to the 
inertial elements of the inflationary process”
38
. Its goal was to increase public revenue 
and reduce expenditures. First, the trade tax was increased. This was a double-edged 
sword in the long-term because it could handicap the country’s export as it was 
already suffering in this external sector as the foreign investors had. Second, a large 
increase in domestic credit and money supply was planned. In addition to that, the 
exchange rate was fixed and the currency was for this short period the Austral which 
was equal to 1000 Peso Argentino. The introduction of this new currency was 
accompanied by the promise from the government not to finance the deficit by 
printing money. But the main measure of the program was the implementation of a 
freeze-realignment program on three anchors: prices, wages and the exchange rate. 
They were all frozen and relative prices were realigned in order to avoid distortions. 
This approach allowed inflation to persist at a lower level. Thus, the exchange rate 
and public sector prices, which were the two main anchors, were initially overvalued 
in order to maintain the freeze on nominal values. On the contrary, wages were 
initially restrained in order to support the fiscal effort and the restrained demand (Mc 
Comb, 1997; Kiguel, 1989). 
             This program worked in the short-term and inflation fell. Soon the economy 
went into an expansionary cycle however, and growing demand began to be a threat 
for the inflation effort. In fact, the fixed exchange rates were hard to maintain. 
Furthermore commodity prices had fallen in the rest of the world. As can be seen in 
Figure 8 the terms of trade deteriorated even more than before the plan. In 1987 the 
current account had reached -4.2 billion dollars. In addition to that, the government 
couldn’t rein in the social security system or the provincial governments that were 
spending too much and were majorly responsible for the growing fiscal deficit. 
Alfonsin’ solution was to limit access to the treasury for these public branches in 
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order to create incentives for them to try to balance their budgets. But the program 
failed and between 1987 and 1989, the deficit stayed at a high level, between 7 and 
8%. The ensuing period of hyperinflation had the effect of keeping the deficit high. In 
1988 Alfonsin tried one last time to stabilize the economy by launching the Primavera 
plan- as illustrated in the circle dashed line in Figure 19, but it collapsed a few months 
after and inflation rose to 3000% (The World Bank, 1993; Mc Comb, 1997). 
For this period, it is quite hard to determine a trade-off between inflation and the 
other variables for two reasons. Firstly, inflation really soared to numbers never seen 
before in the country. Secondly, the political situation was again not very stable. But 
in general, we noticed a rather negative relationship between inflation and 
unemployment and real wages.  
3. F. July 1989- April 1991: disastrous start for the Menem 
administration 
                         In 1989 the country was worse off than before Alfonsin. The high 
inflation period was producing tax collection lags and “opaqueness over tax 
returns”39. Moreover, the public firms’ prices were taken as an indicator for the 
quality of the government policy, and were therefore kept frozen, which contributed 
to the fiscal deficit. Money creation increased and with it inflation. The State 
defaulted on its debt. 
           In May 1989 Carlos Saul Menem, the Peronist candidate, was elected president. 
In July hyperinflation had reached 200%. His aim was to restore a market economy 
and of course to solve the inflation problem.  
             In the beginning the government launched the “Bunge and Born Plan”. This 
was a moderately heterodox price control program similar to that implemented by 
Alfonsin. But this plan failed. In December Menem had to abandon all his campaign 
promises. On the 10th of this month the government deliberately defaulted on its 
internal debt and prices were allowed to float. The value of the Austral against the 
dollar depreciated reaching 5585 pesos per dollar in 1990. Withdrawals of bank 
deposits continued and on the 1st January 1990 the “Bonex plan” was launched.  The 
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main policies were to privatize many public firms and the government replaced short-
term domestic debt and time-deposits with ten year bonds. But the much discounted 
bonds led to a massive capital loss. The deficit that didn’t include interest payments 
was not reduced and had to be repaid by money creation. Inflation reached a peak of 
20,000% at the beginning of 1990. Public payments were delayed. In March 1990 
more severe fiscal measures were taken but the reforms performed poorly and didn’t 
reduce inflation below 10% per month. Privatization was hard and the measures were 
only very slowly implemented (Corrales, 2002).  
 
3. G. 1991-2002: Argentina’s currency board: pegging the Peso to the 
Dollar 
Figure 20: CPI, GDP per Capita, the unemployment rate and an index of real wages 1991-2002 
(1965=100) 
 
             In January 1991 Domingo Cavallo was appointed economy minister. Despite 
the very tight monetary reforms, inflation was high and the peso value increasing 
against the dollar: Argentina was again facing a crisis. In April 1991 the Austral was 
abandoned and the peso was reinstated. From 1991 to 2001 the peso was pegged to 
the dollar at a ratio of 1:1. This was called the convertibility period or the currency 
board. It was the longest period in the second half of the 20th century in which the 
exchange rate remained stable. Such a system comes with its rules and Argentina 
broke most of them. 
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            The policy first showed impressive results. It was successful at bringing 
inflation down, GDP grew at a rate of 7% until 1995 and trust was restored to the 
Argentine financial system.  At the end of 1994 the Mexican economy faced a 
currency crisis as and the Argentine economy suffered from what was called the 
tequila effect. This overshadowed Menem’s re-election in 1995. Despite GDP growth 
being 6% after the elections the rest of the economy was starting to fail. 
Unemployment increased as did inequality. The government was also facing 
corruption accusations and public debt had increased. As a result Minister Cavallo 
who was responsible for economic policy was dismissed in 1996. The financial crises 
in Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999 affected Argentina strongly, 
especially that in Brazil which was Argentina’s second largest trade partner. The peso 
pegged to a strong dollar combined with smaller foreign demand made Argentina less 
competitive. It permanently ran a current account deficit.  After 1995, the current 
account balance fell and reached a minimum of -14 billion dollars in 1998 (Frenkel, 
2007). 
             In 1999 Fernando de la Rúa was elected president. He launched a program 
called “el impuestazo” in order to reduce the budget deficit. To achieve these taxes 
were increased as the government found it difficult to reduce public spending. 
Moreover, in March of 1999 the IMF accorded a $7.2 billion standby loan to 
Argentina. The president rapidly lost the support of the people. The unions went on 
strike to protest against deregulation in the labor market. Unemployment and public 
debt continued to increase. Moreover there were chronic difficulties in the financial 
relationship between the central government and the provinces. Investors and 
lenders lost confidence in Argentina, which led to a liquidity crisis in November 2000. 
Desperate, the government called Domingo Cavallo back to the ministry of finance on 
March 20th of 2001. But in the middle of November the government was again 
running out of liquidity. Withdrawals of deposits increased and foreign exchange 
reserves decreased. The government had to close banks and freeze bank deposits. 
After reopening the banks it authorized a withdrawal of only $250 per week. This was 
called the “Corralito”. Unions called for a general strike and chaos in the streets 
began, with almost thirty people dying.  The approach of Cavallo was rejected and he 
resigned, followed shortly after by the president (Ruddies, 2008). 
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             After three very short-term failed presidencies, Eduardo Duhalde became the 
fifth president in two weeks. His first measure was to abandon the currency board 
and to introduce a dual exchange rate system. We mentioned earlier the view of 
Frieden and Stein that the pegging of the Peso to the Dollar wasn’t likely to bring real 
appreciation and that inflation targeting was more important for decision makers 
than a real appreciation in a period of hyperinflation. We know now that fixing the 
exchange rate did bring about a real appreciation and brought the current account in 
to deficit. Indeed, it is true that authorities chose inflation over the trade balance. 
This was the major reason for the failure of the currency peg and the highly unstable 
unemployment rate. Figure 20 shows how the unemployment rate grew before 1998 
and then decreased and then increased again. In this case, as prices were kept very 
stable, it is impossible to define a relationship between inflation and the other 
variables.  
 
3. H. 2002-2009: stable economy? 
Figure 21: CPI, GDP per Capita, the unemployment and an index of real wages 2002-2009 
(1965=100) 
 
           In February 2002 under an IMF agreement Argentina implemented a free 
floating exchange rate which led to a huge devaluation of the peso. The Central Bank 
started to intervene by selling dollars to avoid it. The government also regulated 
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foreign capital outflows and imposed exchange rate controls. The peso stabilized 
against the dollar (Felder, 2008). 
          In May 2003 Néstor Kirchner was elected president. The stable and competitive 
real exchange rate or SCRER was the centre of his program and led Argentina to rapid 
growth. Since then the peso stayed stable at around 3 pesos per dollar. The annual 
growth of GDP between 2002 and 2007 was 6.3%. The investment rate also increased 
sharply. In 2004 the public debt was re-negotiated and reduced and in 2005 the debt 
with the IMF was paid with the help of Venezuela. The SCRER also had a preventative 
role for inflation acceleration. In December 2007 Cristina Elizabeth Fernández de 
Kirchner, Néstor Kirchner’s wife, became president (Frenkel, 2008). 
             But the recovery of consumption and the depreciated currency has led to 
acceleration in inflation since 2004 despite what the official numbers say. An 
“alternative” statistical agency published a report that inflation had increased from 
26% in 2006 to 30% in 2008. Between 2004 and 2006 there were negotiations 
between economic authorities and price setters in order to regulate prices, and 
between workers and unions to regulate wages. But since 2007 the negotiation’s 
effectiveness has slowed down. Wage claims have grown along with the economy’s 
recovery. The labor force is asking for higher wages. Moreover, people’s incomes 
have struggled “to keep up with [the] price increases of the 2000’s”40. (Felder, 2008; 
The economist, 2008). In 2009, in the midst of the world financial crisis, the economy 
is deteriorating and Crisitina Kirchner has become less popular   
 
To summarize we saw that Argentina has faced several periods of hyper- and chronic 
inflation since 1945 and no policy succeeded in reducing inflation in the long-term. 
The longest period of stabilization was the currency board, but in the end this also 
failed. 
 It was not easy to determinate any trade-off between inflation and unemployment, 
GDP or wages. In the short term, we observed both positive and negative 
correlations. In what follows we search for a long-run relationship between these 
variables. 
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5. Empirical evidence for the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in 
Argentina: influence of inflation and inflation stabilization on 
society 
After vainly trying to determine through graphical representation a trade-off between 
inflation and other variables that reflect society we now turn to regression 
techniques. In particular, we analyze the Phillips curve.  In 1958 William Phillips 
conducted a study of inflation in the UK over the previous hundred years. He 
observed an inverse short term trade-off between wage changes and unemployment. 
In the 1960’s, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow extended his work and proved that 
this relationship also held for the USA (Cashell, 2004).  
After many critics, a New Keynesian Phillips curve was provided. This is the one we 
will use basing on several literature. Gali and Gertler (1999) found a positive 
relationship between wage share and inflation for USA and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-
Salido (2001) for Europe. Bardsen, Jansen and Nymoen (2002) support their results 
for the Euro zone, and specially test the NKPC relationship for United Kingdom and 
Norway where they also obtain a positive relationship.  For Argentina, there was little 
literature on the Phillips curve, though Nugent and Glezakos (1982) predicted that the 
inflation-marginal cost trade-off was the opposite for Latin America when compared 
to developed countries. There argument was stated for the “most agricultural”41 
group of Latin American countries however and they did not include Argentina in the 
group.  
5. A. Unemployment and Inflation 
5. A. 1. Phillips curve: the origin 
           At the beginning, Phillips wanted to show that there was a relationship 
between inflation and wage changes. The original equation taken from Gilbert (1976) 
was: 
 +  =  !  
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where  is the rate of change in wages,  is a vector of variables that also influence 
wages and !  is the unemployment rate. (Gilbert, 1976) 
The second step was to change wage changes for inflation. Rewriting the previous 
equation with the help of Humphrey (1985), the Phillips curve equation with inflation 
is: 
 =  ! +  
where π is the inflation rate. (Humphrey, 1985) 
During the 1970’s, the expected inflation, also called inflation inertia, was added to 
the equation in order to capture the inflationary expectations. The curve became: 
 = " +  ! +  
where "  is the expected inflation rate. 
Finally, the unemployment rate was replaced with the deviation natural rate of 
unemployment and the supply shocks variable # replaced A. We obtain the final 
Phillips curve equation states inflation as a function of the unemployment rate 
deviation from the natural rate and the supply shocks and expected inflation, also 
described as the triangle model by Gordon (1991): 
  =   # − $%! − !&' +  "  
where %! − !&' is the deviation from the natural rate of unemployment. (Gordon, 
1991) 
 
             In the case of Argentina, we make the simple assumption that people expect 
inflation to grow at the same rate as the previous period, this is called “adaptive 
expectations”42: " =  . Often it is assumed that expectations are based on more 
than one lag of inflation. We can rewrite the Phillips curve equation in the case of 
expectations depending on the past h periods as: 
 = ( )*
+
*,
*  − $%! − !&' +  # 
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where )* is the weight attached to inflation in each period when forming 
expectations. According to this equation, inflation is a function of past inflation, the 
deviation of unemployment from the natural rate and supply shocks. This implies that 
inflation has inertia, i.e. in the case where there would be no supply shock and no 
deviation from the natural rate of unemployment, inflation would still grow. Robert 
Solow described this phenomenon in the 1970’s: “we have inflation because we 
expect inflation, and we expect inflation because we’ve had it”43. The second term of 
this equation is the more important: It shows that lower inflation leads to higher 
unemployment deviation from the natural rate because of the negative sign before 
the coefficient ß. In the short run, increasing inflation could be a good instrument for 
the Government in order to keep the unemployment rate close to its natural level. 
The equation also implies that if the government’s main priority is to lower inflation 
the policy response would feed unemployment. This relationship is only valid in the 
short-run however because people adjust their inflation expectations in each period. 
This is why in most studies there is a restriction imposed on the above equation such 
that the sum of the weights on past inflation should equal one, i.e.  ∑ )*+*, = 1. The 
Phillips curve in this form predicted unemployment well in the 1960’s for the USA. It 
had a downward slope as can be observed in Figure 22(Gali, 2001; Mankiw, 2006). 
                                                      
43
 From Solow (in Mankiw, 2006 p. 388).  
49 
Figure 22: Phillips Curve in the 1960's in the USA44 
 
         
             Enlarging the Phillips curve, Gali and Gertler (1999) used the marginal cost 
/ instead of the unemployment rate deviation. Their version of the old Phillips 
curve is then: 
 =   # − $%/' + "  
In the case of Argentina we estimated the above equation with one lag of inflation 
and the output gap as a measure of the marginal cost. We obtained for the period the 
following results: 
For inflation no log 
 =  0.45 − 9.34. 678 %	 − 	 ∗' + 0.98 
                                 (0.12)                   (4.98.E-08)               (0.6) 
where yt is the actual output, 	∗ is the potential output and %	 − 	 ∗' is the output 
gap and standard errors are below in brackets. In this regression, inflation is positively 
correlated to the past inflation and negatively correlated to the output gap. Thus, if 
the actual output is above the potential output, it will lower inflation. This relation is 
to be expected. Furthermore, in a very efficient economy in which actual GDP is 
higher than potential GDP, one would presume that the unemployment will also 
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decrease. Here we can predict a positive relationship between inflation and 
unemployment.  
 All the variables are significant and the model seems to be doing a good job 
predicting the inflation influence on the output gap as can be distinguish on Figure 
23. In fact, the fitted values and the actual value seem to move together. The 
standard error of the coefficient on the output gap is relatively large, but this may be 
explained by the short-term hyperinflation episodes seen in Argentina.   
Figure 23: Actual versus fitted values 
 
 
             Some opponents of Keynesian theory, such as Milton Friedman and Edmund 
Phelps proved that the Phillips curve relationship disappeared after the 1960’s. They 
advanced the theory that the unemployment rate tends toward a “natural rate”, 
which is defined as “the lowest rate of unemployment consistent with stable rate of 
inflation”.45 They argued that in the long-run there was no trade-off and that the 
Phillips curve was vertical at this precise rate. Friedman stated that “there is always a 
temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no permanent 
trade-off.”46 He also criticized the lack of microeconomic foundations for the 
Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Finally and more importantly there was concern 
over the fact that the model didn’t seem to fit the data after the 1990’s. 
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            The Phillips curve seems to fit Argentine data on inflation and the output gap 
quite well over the period 1970-1990. Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) studied the 
long-term trade-off between unemployment and inflation and tried to find a 
microeconomic justification for such a relationship. In the 1980s the “new Keynesian 
Phillips curve” concept was developed based on the fact that prices could be sticky, 
i.e. prices adjust only slowly. They emphasized “staggered nominal wage and price 
setting by forward looking individuals and firms”.47 We will use the structural model 
of Gertler and Gali (1999) to examine if there is a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment in Argentina (Whelan, 2005; Gali, 1999). 
5. A. 2. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) 
           We follow Gertler and Gali (1999) and assume an environment of 
monopolistically competitive firms that are constrained by price adjustments. We use 
the Calvo48 assumption that in any period t, the firms adjust their prices with 
probability %1 − :' and don’t change them with probability θ, which introduces price 
stickiness in to the model. Firms produce different items and have a different pricing 
history, but in all other senses are ex ante identical. Since not every firm can change 
their prices in each period there is a loss for them in the period when their prices are 
rigid. If there were no frictions firms would choose an optimal price ψ<*, but they 
actually choose an optimal reset price ∗, which is the “price selected by firms that 
are able to change price at t”49, i.e. to reset their price by minimizing their loss 
function: 
(1)  =%∗' = ∑ %:ß'*?*,7 6%∗ − ψ<*'@ 
where 0<ß<1 and 6%∗ − ψ<*'@ is the expected loss due to price stickiness. The 
firm will have to keep a price ∗ for k periods even though it could have been at the 
optimal ψ<*, meaning the firm will make a lower profit than the optimal one. In 
order to calculate its loss function, the firm sums the expectations for all present and 
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future periods and weights them with a discount coefficient %:ß'*. Since ß is less 
than one the firm gives more weight to the present loss than the future one. 
In order to minimize this loss, we differentiate L(∗) with respect to ∗ and set it 
equal to zero. The first order condition is:  
(2) =A%∗' = 2 ∑ %:ß'*?*,7 6%∗ − ψ<*' = 0 
Rewriting this, we obtain: 
(3) ∑ %:ß'*?*,7  . ∗ = ∑ %:ß'*?*,7 6%ψ<*' 
and since ∑ %:ß'*?*,7  is a geometric sum we can write: 
(4) ∑ %:ß'*?*,7 = Cß 
Finally we obtain the optimal reset price: 
(5) ∗ = %1 − :ß' ∑ %:ß'*?*,7 6%ψ<*' 
Firms keep their reset price at a weighted average of the optimal frictional price. 
According to microeconomic theory in a non frictional world, firms set their optimal 
prices equal to their marginal cost /: 
(6) ψ<* = /<* 
Substituting (6) in to (5) we obtain the optimal reset price: 
(7) ∗ = %1 − ß:' ∑ %?*,7 ß:'DEF{/<*} 
Following the Calvo assumption, the price it period t, p, is a function of the price of 
the last period and the optimal reset price: 
(8)  = : + %1 − :'∗ <=> 
(9) ∗ = C  % − :' 
Equation (7) is a stochastic difference equation since the optimal reset price is a 
function of the forcing variable /<*& . So (7) can be rewritten as a first-order 
stochastic difference equation: 
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(10) ∗ = ß:EF<∗ + %1 − ß:'/ 
 
Combining (9) and (10) we obtain:  
(11) 

C  % − :'  = ß:EF<∗ + %1 − ß:'/ 
And for <∗ = C  %< − :', we obtain:  
(12) 

C  % − :'  =
ßC
C %EF< − :' + %1 − ß:'/ 
The inflation rate is defined as the ratio of the difference in prices in period t and 
prices in the previous period on prices in period t: 
(13)   = KKLMK  
Rearranging equation (12), we obtain an initial expression for the Phillips curve: 
(14)   = ßEF< + %ßC'%C'C %/ − ' 
The real marginal cost is /N = / −  which means that: 
(15)   = ßEF< + %ßC'%C'C /N 
After simplification the final expression of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is:  
(16) OP = QRSPT +  ß UV{OP<W} + XYP 
 
where λ = 
%C'%ßC'
C  , ZK is a stochastic error term and EF{<} is the expected 
value of future inflation. Equation (16) indicates that inflation in one period is a 
function of the marginal cost and the expected inflation in the following period. 
Contrary to the old Phillips curve, firms are assumed to have rational expectations, 
i.e. they think inflation depends on future expected prices.  
            The marginal cost is not exogenous however. As such, we add to the previous 
equation a second equation for marginal cost: 
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(17)  =  [/ +  ß< − ß\< + ZK 
(18) / =   +  @/ + Z]^ 
where EF{<} =  < − \< and \< is the expectation error. If b1 is equal to 
zero, the marginal cost is exogenous which means that it is not correlated to the error 
term. In this case, the OLS estimator for the marginal cost coefficient is not biased. 
 
5. A. 3. Empirical relevance of the NKPC for Argentina  
             We will use the generalized method of moments (GMM) in order to examine 
the empirical relevance of the Phillips curve. This method was formulated by Hansen 
in 1982 and provides a computationally convenient system of obtaining estimators of 
the parameters of statistical models. Let’s consider the regression equation 
	 = _` + Z for t=1,….,n, where _  is a vector of the explanatory variables, ` a 
vector of unknown coefficients variables and Z the stochastic error term. There is a 
possibility that, for some k, _  is correlated with the error term, in other words that 
E(_*Z' ≠ 0. If this is the case then _*  is an endogeneous variable, i.e. it is explained 
within the model in which it appears. But if the vector _  contains an endogenous 
variable, the least square (LS) estimator `* is biased. The principle of the GMM 
method is to find an estimator for ` by replacing the theoretical relation with sample 
moments. In order to correct for this, instrumental variables estimation can be used, 
in which a vector of instrumental variables xt is correlated with _  but not with Z, i.e.: 
6%bZ' = 0 
<=> 6cb%	 − _`'d = 0 
When this is the case, the vectors b and %	 − _`' are orthogonal. The latter 
equation is called the orthogonality condition.50 It is then possible to create 
estimating equations for ` with the help of those instrumental variables that match 
the orthogonality condition.  We obtain an “indirect least square estimator”51 that is 
not biased. 
                                                      
50
  www.princeton.edu/~yangfeng/intro/gmm.pdf  
51
 www.princeton.edu/~yangfeng/intro/gmm.pdf p. 4. 
55 
           We will assume that the marginal cost is endogenous and will verify this 
hypothesis later with a Wald test. We choose, as instrumental variables, information 
from previous periods which are not correlated to inflation forecast errors, such that: 
(19) 6{% − $< − [/'e} = 0  
where e is a vector of instrumental variables dated at period t and earlier.  
             We regressed Argentine inflation on the unemployment rate and forecasted 
inflation. Our instruments are information from previous periods and under rational 
expectations the errors in the forecast of < and of / are uncorrelated with this 
information. We chose three lags of inflation, wage inflation, the output gap (defined 
as real GDP minus the detrended log of the GDP) and marriage because they are 
correlated to the marginal cost but not with the error term. We obtained: 
 = −0.02/N +  0.53 EF{<} + 0.21 
                                                      (0.004)          (0.007)             (0.034) 
The coefficients on all variables are significant. There seems to exist a negative 
correlation between inflation and the unemployment rate. Considering the cross 
correlogram of inflation and unemployment (Figure 24) we observe that the 
unemployment rate appears to be negatively correlated with future inflation but 
positively correlated with past inflation. In what follows we consider the hybrid form 
of the NKPC where both forward and backward inflation are included in the 
regression. 
Figure 24: Cross correlogram
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             Before drawing further conclusion we consider the robustness of our model. 
One problem of the IV method is that the more instruments we add to the regression 
model the greater the risk of bias, particularly if the instruments used are weak. To 
examine the strength of our instruments we begin by testing if the instrumental 
variables and the endogenous variable are really correlated. We regressed the 
unemployment rate using Ordinary Least Square on the instruments as follows: 
/   f + h@ + h@i + hi + hj∆ + hl%	 − 	∗'  + Z 
where ∆ is wage inflation in period t, mar the marriage variable. After estimating 
this regression we conducted a Wald coefficient test to test the Null hypothesis of 
whether the instrument variables and the unemployment rate are uncorrelated, i.e.: 
f = h = h@ = hi = hj = hl = 0 
The F-statistic is significant as its associated p-value is 0.0001, so we can reject the 
Null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the unemployment rate. 
This also confirms our hypothesis that the unemployment rate is really endogenous. 
In addition, since there are more instruments than endogenous explanatory variables 
we can test for overidentifying restrictions, which is a method of indirectly testing for 
the exogeneity of the instrument set. To do this we employed the Hansen test, with 
the results indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, meaning that we can 
accept the instrument set.  
                Finally we test for autocorrelation of the errors. We use the Ljung-Box test 
which tests if the value of the residuals in period t is correlated to values in previous 
periods. The Null hypothesis is that all autocorrelations are equal to zero, i.e. there is 
no autocorrelation.  As can be seen in Table 1, the lags for the autocorrelation 
coefficients (AC) are all close to 0. The Ljung-Box Q-statistics are also insignificant, so 
we can’t reject the Null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation.  
 
Table 1: Ljung-Box test: Autocorrelation coefficients and Q-statistics residuals from the 
regression of inflation on unemployment 
  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1 0.042 0.042 0.0344 0.853 
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2 0.051 0.050 0.0888 0.957 
3 0.030 0.026 0.1086 0.991 
4 0.000 -0.004 0.1086 0.999 
5 0.020 0.017 0.1189 1.000 
6 -0.021 -0.023 0.1310 1.000 
7 -0.116 -0.117 0.5611 0.999 
8 -0.006 0.004 0.5623 1.000 
9 -0.099 -0.088 0.9639 1.000 
10 -0.141 -0.132 1.9185 0.997 
11 -0.119 -0.105 2.7325 0.994 
12 -0.093 -0.071 3.3486 0.993 
13 -0.022 -0.012 3.3955 0.996 
14 0.005 0.004 3.3993 0.998 
 
           The results of these three tests give added confidence to the validity of the 
empirical model estimated. The results imply that the higher the rate of inflation in 
the higher will be the unemployment rate. This result is consistent with the evidence 
presented in the first part of the thesis where it was shown that the inflation and 
unemployment rates were both very high for most of the second half of the 2Oth 
century. Gali and Gertler (2001) also obtained a positive correlation using the wage 
share as their measure of marginal cost for Europe54. Jeffrey B. Nugent and 
Constantine Glezakos (1982) predicted the opposite result for Latin America countries 
however. They argued that “the institutional conditions of (…) LDCs [least developed 
countries
55
] would be likely to lead to exactly the opposite relationship between 
inflation and unemployment (or growth) in LDCs than that expected for DCs 
[developed countries
55
]”
56
. In the following sub-sections we examine whether the 
choice of variable capturing marginal cost affects the results obtained. In particular, 
we replace the unemployment rate with the wage share, thus following the approach 
of Gali and Gertler (YEAR). 
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 See Gali (2004). 
55
 Note from the author  
56
 Nugent, 1982, p. 322. 
5. B. GDP and inflation: measuring the output gap in the New Keynesian 
Phillips Curve 
Figure 25: Cross correlogram 
t+k57 
 
           Frequently, the New Phillips curve 
measures the real economy activity, as the marginal cost
correlogram of inflation and 
relationship between the
relationship between the output gap and leads of the inflation rate.
is the contrary to wh
unemployment rate and 
equation with the output gap 
(21)
 
Using GMM, we have to change the instruments because the output gap can’t be an 
instrument this time. So we remove it and add a lag of wage inflation, investment and 
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real wages, which we assume to be correlated with the output gap. We obtained for 
the NKPC: 
 
  5.29%	 − 	∗' +  0.286{<} +  0.73 − 0.005 
                                       (0.000)                    (0.050)            (0.003)       (0.01) 
The regression shows a negative relationship between output gap and inflation. As 
before, we test the validity of the model. First we performed the Wald test to 
examine if our instruments are weak. To do this we regressed the output gap using 
OLS on the instruments: 
%	 − 	∗' = f + h@ + h@i + hi + hj∆ + hl∆ + hno + Z 
 We then test the Null hypothesis that the instruments and the output gap are 
uncorrelated, i.e.: 
f = h = h@ = hi = hj = hl = hn = 0 
The p-value associated with the F-statistic of this Wald test is 0.04 which means that 
we can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. 
           We then proceeded to consider the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. 
The J-statistic is 0.06 and its p-value is 0.56, so there is no evidence of the 
endogeneity of the instruments. Finally, we test for serial correlation in the residuals 
using the Ljung-Box test: 
Table 2: Ljung-Box test: Autocorrelation function and Q-statistic for the residuals from the 
regressions of inflation on output gap 
  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1 
-0.140 -0.140 0.6661 0.414 
2 
0.004 -0.016 0.6667 0.717 
3 
0.020 0.019 0.6811 0.878 
4 
0.048 0.055 0.7697 0.942 
5 
-0.012 0.003 0.7755 0.979 
6 
-0.198 -0.204 2.3741 0.882 
7 
0.049 -0.010 2.4777 0.929 
8 
0.022 0.028 2.4991 0.962 
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The individual autocorrelations are all close to 0 and insignificant, while the Ljung-Box 
Q statistics at different lags are also insignificant, meaning that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the residuals are serially correlated. 
           When considering the output gap as a measure of marginal cost our model 
does also a good job of predicting the trade-off between GDP and inflation? In the 
case of Argentina, there seems to be a long-run negative relationship between the 
two variables, which is, as expected, the contrary to the relationship between 
inflation and unemployment. This means that as inflation was increasing, the output 
gap was decreasing. Gali and Gertler (1999) also considered other variables 
measuring marginal costs. We will now examine if these variables are also correlated 
with inflation, and if so in which direction. 
 
5. C. Inflation and labor factors: measuring the labor factors in the NKPC 
 
           In this sub-chapter, we consider the relationship between inflation and labor 
productivity and the wage share. The wage share is an indicator of the distribution of 
income between capital and labor as is measured as labor compensation divided by 
GDP.  
5. C. 1. Inflation and wage share 
 
             The wage share is used in much of the literature as a measure of the marginal 
cost. As such, it is important to consider this variable, which will allow a comparison 
with the existing literature. Marginal cost represents the price of one additional unit 
of labor. Firms minimize their costs and therefore require that the marginal cost be 
equal to the wage divided by the marginal product of labor. Thus the wage share  
is:  
/   
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As above, we use GMM to estimate the Phillips curve, replacing unemployment by 
the wage share. We use the same instruments as for unemployment. We obtain the 
following results (standard errors in brackets): 
  0.007  +  0.366{<} +  0.73 − 0.009 
             (0.000)            (0.000)               (0.000)       (0.056) 
All the variables are highly significant and there is a negative relationship observed 
between inflation and the wage share, implying that when the wage share increased 
inflation was declining. This is the contrary relation from unemployment and inflation 
but the same as inflation and output gap. Once again, we test the validity of our 
model in the same manner as above. Results from the Wald and Hansen test indicate 
that there is a correlation between the instruments and the wage share and that 
there is no evidence of endogeneity of the instrument set. Finally, the results in Table 
3 indicate that there is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals from the 
above regression model. 
Table 3: Ljung-Box test: Autocorrelation function and Q-statistic for inflation and wage share 
lags AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1 -0.323 -0.323 1.4898 0.222 
2 0.072 -0.036 1.5717 0.456 
3 -0.001 0.012 1.5717 0.666 
4 -0.022 -0.018 1.5812 0.812 
5 0.011 -0.002 1.5843 0.903 
6 -0.030 -0.029 1.6097 0.952 
7 0.056 0.043 1.7236 0.974 
8 -0.011 0.023 1.7297 0.988 
9 -0.018 -0.018 1.7530 0.995 
 
           To summarize, our model appears to be valid and indicates a negative 
relationship between inflation and the wage share. This means that as inflation 
increased in Argentina, the returns to labor decreased. This trade-off goes in the 
same direction as the one between unemployment and inflation. 
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5. C. 2. Inflation and labor productivity 
 
             Finally, we examine whether there is a significant relationship between the 
inflation rate and labor force productivity. We use GMM to estimate the Phillips 
curve, replacing the wage share by labor productivity with the same instruments as 
for unemployment. The results we obtain are as follows: 
  1.21. 67 qr +  0.426{<} +  0.74 − 1.37 
       (0.000)            (0.002)           (0.000)       (0.08) 
The coefficients are once again all significant, while the results from the tests of the 
validity of the instruments, the endogeneity of the instruments and the test for serial 
correlation in the residuals (Table 4) indicate that this model is well specified. 
 
Table 4: Ljung-Box test: Autocorrelation function and Q-statistic for inflation and labor 
productivity 
lags AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1 0.050 0.050 0.0358 0.850 
2 0.019 0.017 0.0418 0.979 
3 0.029 0.028 0.0572 0.996 
4 -0.038 -0.042 0.0874 0.999 
5 0.017 0.020 0.0943 1.000 
6 -0.015 -0.016 0.1007 1.000 
7 0.052 0.055 0.1959 1.000 
8 0.012 0.005 0.2032 1.000 
9 0.008 0.008 0.2076 1.000 
 
           Our model indicates a positive relationship between labor productivity and 
inflation. This implies that increasing inflation in Argentina is associated with a rise in 
productivity. This is contrary to the relationship found between the unemployment 
rate and inflation. This may relate to the facts that when labour productivity is high, 
firms need to hire fewer workers for a given level of output, which can lead to higher 
unemployment. 
           We saw in the last two sub-chapters that there appears to be a relationship 
between inflation and the output gap, the unemployment rate, the wage share and 
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labor productivity. We also saw in the first part of the thesis that many inflation 
stabilization policies were attempted. In the follow section we examine whether such 
policies were associated with the unemployment rate and other variables measuring 
marginal costs.  
5. D. The relationship between inflation stabilization policies and the 
output gap, the unemployment rate and other labor market indicators 
             In this section we examine whether changes in the policies to deal with 
inflation had an impact on the variables capturing marginal cost. Assuming that 
inflation stabilization policies lead to a decrease of inflation we would expect such 
policies to have an impact on the marginal cost variables. The policy variables are 
dummy variables: 1 for the year where there was one, 0 either.  
5. D. 1. Stabilization policies and unemployment 
 
             In sub-chapter 3.A we found a positive relationship between the 
unemployment rate and inflation. The question we address now is whether or not 
inflation stabilization policies have also had an impact on the unemployment rate. If 
we consider Figure 26 such a relationship is not clear. From 1965 to 1977 changes in 
policies were followed by an increase in the unemployment rate, while from 1977 to 
1993 the unemployment rate seems to have fallen following policy changes.  Figure 
27 plots the correlogram between the unemployment rate and leads and lags of the 
stabilization policies. Here we can observe a relationship between inflation 
stabilization policies and the unemployment rate, with the variables being negatively 
correlated until six leads and then positively correlated. In what follows we examine 
through regression analysis whether these correlations can be confirmed and 
whether the different policy anchors chosen by government have an impact on the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the policy stabilization. 
 
 
 
 Figure 26: inflation stabilization policies and 
 
Figure 27: Cross correlogram
stabilization policies at t+k58 
           Using GMM we regress
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where   refers to the stabilisation policies.  
 
Regressing with OLS on the whole period from 1965 to 2009, we obtained 
insignificant results. But on figure 27, there seem to be different effect: from 1965 to 
1977 (period 1) the unemployment rate tends to increase after the policies; from 
1977 to 1993 (period 2), the unemployment rate tends to decreased after the 
policies; and on the rest, it is not very clear because there were too little inflation 
stabilization between 1993 and now. But here again there are no significant 
relationship. It is not expected as inflation stabilization policies should stop inflation 
that is related to the unemployment rate.  
            Furthermore we want to test if at least some parts of those policies had an 
impact on unemployment and we found that it is negatively correlated to the wage 
controls: 
!  5.95 / +  11.07 
 
And to the exchange rate policies:  
! = −5.16 b +  11.21 
 
          To conclude, we can say that the inflation stabilization policies in general were 
not efficient in reducing unemployment. Only the exchange rate and wage controls 
were successful in bringing it down. This is not what we expected because if inflation 
had decreased from the stabilization policies, unemployment should also have 
decreased as they are positively correlated. 
5. D. 2. Stabilization policies and the output gap 
             We found in sub-chapter 3.B that there is a negative relationship between the 
output gap and inflation. As such, we would expect that there will be a positive 
relationship between policies and the output gap. To examine this, we regress the 
stabilization policies dummy on the output gap as follows:  
%	 − 	∗' = s + Z  
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where s the coefficient on the relationship between stabilization policies and the 
output gap. Again, the regression was estimated using OLS. The results were as 
follows: 
	 − 	∗ = −9236683  + 1722093 
                                                               
           It indicates that there is a negative relationship between the output gap and 
stabilization policies. This is somewhat surprising and against expectations. 
 
5. D. 3. Stabilization policies and labor productivity 
           We showed above that inflation and labor productivity are positively 
correlated, so we may expect that policies intended to bring down inflation should 
also lower labor productivity. We write the relationship between policies and labor 
productivity as: 
q
r = t  + Z 
This model was estimated using GMM with the unemployment rate, investment and 
the output gap used as instruments. Estimating this model gave the following results: 
q
r = −1.076
<7u + 9.36<7u 
 
 
       
 
The results indicate a negative relationship between the stabilisation dummy and 
labor productivity, a result contrary to expectations.  
          In the last three sub-sections we have seen that inflation stabilization policies 
had an unexpected effect on at least two of the variables. In the case of the 
unemployment rate and the wage share we found no significant results. In what 
follows we examine whether stabilization policies had the desired effect on the rate 
of inflation. 
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5. D. 4. Stabilization policies and inflation 
Figure 28: The inflation rate and inflation stabilization policies 
 
           Considering Figure 2859 we see that the policies appeared to have a negative 
impact on the inflation rate.  To examine this in more detail we regress our measure 
of stabilization policies on the inflation rate: 
  v  Z 
where v the coefficient indicating the relationship between the inflation rate and 
policy. With the OLS method we obtained the following results: 
  3.7 + 0.96 
The variables are significant with a positive correlation between the stabilization 
policies and inflation observed. This is contrary to what one would have expected and 
helps explain why the policies appeared to have an unexpected effect on the other 
variables in the above section.  
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5. D. 4. Interpretation of the results 
 
            To summarize we found a positive relationship between the inflation and 
unemployment rates. We further found a negative relationship between the inflation 
rate and both the output gap and the wage share, and a positive one with labor 
productivity. These results imply that rising consumer prices had a negative effect on 
the labor market through a higher unemployment rate. Our results also indicate that 
the authorities were not able to launch a policy that reduced both variables. 
Secondly, the output gap in Argentina declined as inflation increased. If the output 
gap is positive (negative) actual GDP is above (below) potential GDP and the country 
is over (under) working its resources. In general, we would like actual GDP to be as 
close as possible to potential output, i.e. we want the output gap as small as possible. 
Our results show that higher inflation had a positive influence on output since it 
reduced the output gap. We also find that a higher inflation rate reduces the return 
to labor. Finally, labor productivity was found to increase with inflation. This result 
also explain a part of the response of unemployment to inflation, since the higher is 
labor productivity, the lower the incentive of firms to hire new employees. 
             The results when considering the impact of stabilization policies on 
performance indicate that policies often had an unexpected effect on our variables of 
interest, and only in the case of the unemployment rate did policies have a beneficial 
effect, at least in the short-run.  
             It is interesting to note that both the backward and forward components of 
inflation are relevant in the Phillips curve in Argentina as both variables are 
statistically significant in the above analysis. In the case of Argentina however, the 
backward component seems more important than the forward component. This is 
contrary to the analysis of Gali and Gertler (2001) for Europe. 
             Despite the strong results for the Phillips curve we must not put too much 
weight on the results. The data were sometimes incomplete and this could produce 
errors. This is one of the reasons why we considered such a long period of time. In 
addition, the assumptions made in the model are more relevant for developed and 
not least developed countries. Finally, the models were all estimated using GMM, a 
method that is very sensitive to the instruments chosen.  
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In the next chapter we compare the results for Argentina with others in the literature 
for different countries.  
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6. Comparison with the rest of the World 
             It may be interesting to compare the results obtained above with those from 
different countries. Is the impact of inflation on the different measures of the 
marginal costs the same everywhere? Or is it country dependent? As mentioned 
above Nugent and Glezakos (1982) have made hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between inflation and marginal cost measures for entire Latin America. 
We will thus begin by examining whether our results differ from those for other Latin 
American countries. We will then study the difference in results for Argentina – a 
developing country – when compared with results for developed countries. 
6. A. Latin America 
             In this sub-chapter, we will compare the results for the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve for Argentina with those for three other countries: Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
Unfortunately, most of the existing studies on the Phillips curve in those countries go 
back only ten to fifteen years, i.e. the 1990’s, which is a period shorter than that 
considered in the current study. Despite this it is still interesting to consider these 
comparisons. 
6. A. 1. Brazil 
 
              The choice of Brazil was made for three reasons. First of all, Brazil and 
Argentina are neighbours and important trade partners, which includes a Preferential 
Trade Agreement (PTA) between the two countries. Secondly, both countries belong 
to the category “least agricultural” described by Nugent and Glezakos (1982)60. As 
such, we may expect them to follow a similar kind of behaviour. Finally, Brazil has also 
faced periods of high- and even hyper-inflation since the Second World War. We will 
base our comparison on the paper of Adolfo Sachsida (2009)61.  
Sachsida made the assumption that the unemployment and inflation rates differ 
across regions and so used data for several metropolitan areas. They regressed the 
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See Nugent (1982), p. 331. 
61
 Sachsida, 2009. 
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New hybrid Keynesian Phillips curve as in equation (20) with the unemployment rate 
used as the marginal cost variable. Sachsida couldn’t find any significant relationship 
between inflation and unemployment, even in the short term. A further study by 
Muinhos (2001) did find a positive relationship between the output gap and inflation. 
He added to the Phillips curve regression, a variable that represents the degree of 
openness and the Real exchange rate gap and managed to find a positive relationship 
for the years 1994 to 2002. This contradicts our results for Argentina. 
6. A. 2. Chile 
             Chile also neighbours Argentina.  This the main reason for comparing our 
results with those for Chile, though Chile also faced chronic inflation problems in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Moreover, Chile is the third largest of 
Argentina’s trade partners. We will rely on the study of Céspedes, Ochoa and Soto 
(2005). The authors derived the same two new Phillips Curves as we did above, 
namely the normal and hybrid curves. In the former, where the backward component 
is not taken into account, they found a positive relationship between the wage share 
and inflation. In the case of the hybrid New Phillips curve they also found a positive 
relation. These results are different to the ones we found for Argentina, where the 
relationship between the wage share and inflation is negative. Céspedes et al (2005) 
also observed a negative relationship between the inflation rate and the output gap, 
a result consistent with that found above for Argentina. 
6. A. 3. Mexico  
 
             Different to Brazil and Chile, Mexico is far away from Argentina. It has still 
influenced the history of Argentina however, in particular during the Tequila crisis 
mentioned above. Another reason for comparing Mexico and Argentina is that the 
former country also had trouble stabilizing its inflation rate. Finally, Mexico also 
belongs to the “least agricultural” country group60. We will rely on the article of 
Ramos-Francia and Torres (2008) for comparison.  
             Ramos-Francia and Torres (2008) regressed the normal (as opposed to the 
hybrid) NKPC from 1992 until 2007 using monthly data (whereas we used annual 
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data). The results indicate a positive relationship between inflation and the wage 
share. The regression of inflation on the output gap doesn’t result in significant 
coefficients, though when considered the second and third lag of output gap they 
obtained a positive relationship with inflation. Regressing the hybrid NKPC as in 
equation (20), they also find a positive relationship between marginal costs and 
inflation. In their study, inflation is positively correlated to the wage share and the 
output gap, which are positively correlated with each other. This is in contrast with 
what we found for Argentina.  
6. A. 4. Unity in the results for Latin America? 
            There seems to be no consistency in results for the relationship between 
inflation and marginal costs in Latin America. First, let’s consider the case where the 
marginal cost is the wage share. For both Mexico and Chile, a positive relationship 
was found between inflation and the wage share, while for Argentina we find a 
negative relationship. This is surprising as they all belong to the same group of “least 
agricultural” countries and one could expect that they have the same kind of Phillips 
relationships. Second, in Brazil, in the case where the marginal cost is the 
unemployment rate, no significant relationship between inflation and the 
unemployment rate was found. This was predicted by Nugent and Glezakos (1982) 
that only found a relationship between inflation and unemployment for the “most 
agricultural”62 countries, i.e. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela. For this group of countries they obtained exactly the opposite relationship 
between inflation and unemployment as that found for developed countries. To 
conclude, we can say that there is no unity on the impact of inflation on the wage 
share in Latin America. And the impact on unemployment is mixed. 
             Those results help us understand the economic situation in Argentina. The 
country is highly dependent on its exports. But if increasing the wage share in both 
Argentina and its trade partner has a different impact on prices, it will become harder 
to proceed to business transactions between them. And it will be hard for Latin 
America to become a competitive economical unity like the European Union or the 
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USA if they can’t make any inflation stabilization policy without arming one of its 
entities. Moreover, the lack of unity in whole Latin America makes it harder for 
foreign investors to choose investing strategies as the behaviour are different in each 
country. This concerns Argentina even more because Chilli and Mexico have the same 
Phillips curve relationship and the former country doesn’t belong to this group. We 
will now consider the results for developed countries and if Argentina’s Phillips curve 
is more like them. 
 
6. B. Developed countries 
6. B. 1. USA 
             In spite of what one may have thought the United States of America is the 
largest trade partner of Argentina. Argentina has strong links to the USA and pegged 
its currency to the US dollar for ten years. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is very 
successful in identifying the relationship between inflation and the unemployment 
rate for the USA. We will rely on the paper by Alain Guay and Florian Pelgrin (2004), 
who based their work on Gali and Gertler (1999). 
Guay and Pelgrin (2004) began by estimating equation (16), that is, the purely 
forward looking NKPC from 1960 to 2001 for the USA. They use the wage share as 
their indicator of marginal cost. They used a number of techniques to estimate the 
relationship and while they obtained significant coefficients using GMM, results using 
other methods were mixed. Using GMM they found a positive relationship between 
inflation and their measure of marginal costs. Using the hybrid New Phillips Curve 
they found that both the forward and backward components were significant. They 
found that the forward component was dominant and the backward component less 
relevant. These results are different to those found for Argentina, for which we found 
for each measure of the marginal cost a backward looking component. This would 
mean that in the USA, rational expectations have more weight in the decision of the 
firm to set prices than in Argentina where they base their expectations on the past 
behaviour of inflation. Guay and Pelgrin (2004) obtain a positive relationship between 
the wage share and inflation which is different to our results for Argentina. 
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 6. B. 2. Europe 
             Finally, we compare Argentina’s inflation-marginal cost relationship with that 
found for Europe. This should be interesting because the old continent has a very 
different approach to Economics than America. Will the Phillips curve in European 
countries behave similarly to that for the USA because they are all developed 
countries or will they behave differently to both Latin America and North America? 
We will now present the results obtained by Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001). 
             Gali et al (2001) took the wage share as the marginal cost and used data from 
1970 to 1998 for the euro zone. Regressing the base line model (16) using GMM they 
obtained a positive relationship between marginal cost and inflation. There were 
problems of autocorrelation in the residuals in this model and so they turned to the 
Hybrid Phillips curve and again found a positive relationship between the wage share 
and inflation, a result similar to that found in the USA. Consistent with the results for 
the USA, Gali et al (2001) found that forward looking component was dominant when 
compared with the backward looking component. 
           To conclude, we can say that the results indicate that the Phillips curve for the 
USA and Europe behave similarly. Firstly, there is a positive relation between the 
wage share and inflation. Secondly, the forward component is dominant, i.e. the firms 
have rational expectations even if the backward component is also important.  
Thirdly, it is interesting to notice that the relationship between wage share and 
inflation is the same in Mexico, Chilli, USA and Europe but not in Argentina. Nugent 
and Glezakos (1982) predicted that the Phillips curve relationship in developed and 
least developed countries would not be the same. But they only concentrated on the 
unemployment rate as the marginal cost. Here again, It emphasizes the bad economic 
situation for Argentina. It could also explain why Argentina’s inflation stabilisation 
policies weren’t very successful: it was always going against its main trade partner’s 
policies.  
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7. Conclusion 
             After studying the history of Argentina and the behaviour of the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve from 1945 to 2009 we were able to draw some conclusions 
on the impact of inflation on society. The history showed that inflation has been most 
of the time high since the Second World War in Argentina and, as they are positively 
related, it brought high unemployment rates. Moreover, workers received very low 
return from capital as wage share and inflation are negatively correlated. These 
dissatisfactions were often expressed in the form of demonstrations. At the beginning 
of the 21th century, the collapse of the convertibility period and the increase of 
inflation even brought political anarchy in the country for a moment.  By reducing 
inflation the Argentine authorities could help lower unemployment, though this 
would negatively affect labor productivity. Lower inflation would also be a way to 
increase the return to labor. So why has no government been able to decrease 
inflation in the long-run?  
The estimation for the new Phillips curve for Argentina with the rest of the World 
showed that when comparing with other “least agricultural”63 Latin America 
countries there was no consistency in the results obtained. The Phillips curve is 
specific to every country, even every region. The comparison with the USA and 
Europe showed us that the Phillips curve relationship for Argentina works in the 
opposite direction to that for these two regions. So their policies to reduce inflation 
should go in different directions. And when the peso is pegged to the dollar, both 
countries are strongly linked. So if one needs to increase inflation to decrease 
unemployment and the other need the contrary, the smallest country, i.e. Argentina, 
will face even more inflation and won’t be able to launch the right policy. This may be 
an explanation for the lack of efficient inflation stabilization policies in Argentina. In 
addition, the forward component of the curve seems to be dominant in developed 
countries while in Argentina the backward component is more important. This implies 
different behaviour for firms in Argentina when compared with those in North 
                                                      
63
 See Nugent (1982), p. 331. 
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America and the Euro zone. And again, it makes it hard for the countries to be trade 
partners.  
Why weren’t the Governments able to reduce inflation?  As mentioned, the Argentine 
relationship with the rest of the World may have handicapped them. In addition to 
that, the lack of long-term presidency and the frequent change of Government 
weren’t of any help. And as the populous was struggling with high prices and high 
unemployment rate, the social conflicts restrained furthermore the establishment of 
long term policy. And finally, the Governments may have not always protected the 
best interest of their people all the time. In fact, the corruption level in Argentina was 
and still is very high. 
             We could have gone in to further detail in our study in order to test whether 
the variables chosen for the marginal costs give a good representation of the society 
and are accurate to test the impact of inflation on society. In order to examine if 
people care about unemployment a “happiness test” would have been relevant, such 
as the one conducted by Di Tella, Mac Culloch and Oswald (2001)64. To do this 
however, one would have had to conduct surveys in Argentina.  
            Last but not least, one cannot find a reason for Argentina’s situation based 
solely on its economy. Yordon found a sociological explanation: “the basic cause, the 
failure of Argentina leaders to resolve social conflicts and to achieve unity, seems to 
lie in certain personality traits characteristic of the Argentine culture.”
65
 We can add 
to this point of view the opinion of Gino Germani “Due to the peculiarities of his 
manner of life, (the Argentine) was an anarchic individual, a lover of personal 
independence and siposed to recognize authority only of those who excelled in the 
qualities he respected most: bravery and skill, for example”66.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
64
 Di Tella, 2001. 
65
 See Yordon (1965), p. 87. 
66
 From Germani (1962) (in Yordon (1965), p. 87).   
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Price and wage indices from 1948 to 1961 (1950=100) 
Year Agri. 
prices 
agri. prices 
growth 
Cost of 
living 
cost of 
living 
growth 
industri
al 
wages 
Manuf. 
prices 
import 
prices 
real 
wages 
real wage 
growth 
1948 68  64  61 68 69 95  
1949 82 20,59% 80 25,00% 84 88 85 105 10,53% 
1950 100 21,95% 100 25,00% 100 100 100 100 -4,76% 
1951 152 52,00% 137 37,00% 127 132 161 93 -7,00% 
1952 180 18,42% 190 38,69% 156 159 210 83 -10,75% 
1953 218 21,11% 197 3,68% 170 164 218 86 3,61% 
1954 220 0,92% 205 4,06% 194 184 216 95 10,47% 
1955 232 5,45% 230 12,20% 216 214 241 94 -1,05% 
1956 328 41,38% 261 13,48% 246 248 392 94 0,00% 
1957 412 25,61% 325 24,52% 329 299 434 101 7,45% 
1958 550 33,50% 428 31,69% 454 401 532 106 4,95% 
1959 1375 150,00% 914 113,55% 771 807 1482 84 -20,75% 
1960 1555 13,09% 1163 27,24% 905 990 1660 78 -7,14% 
1961 1648 5,98% 1321 13,59% 1258 1080 1610 95 21,79% 
1962 2270 3774,27% 1694 28,24% 1587 1380 2140 94 -1,05% 
Source: (Yordon, 1965) 
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Annex 2: Level and growth of the Consumer Price Index (1945 to 2009) 
Head of 
State 
year yearly average 
consumer price 
index 
 growth Head of State YEAR yearly average 
consumer price 
index 
growth 
  Base 1945=100    Base 1945=100  
 1945 100  Alfonsin 1984 8945573295 626,74% 
Peron 1946 117,7068215 17,71% (Austral plan) 1985 69063860668 672,05% 
 1947 133,6719884 13,56%  1986 1,31299E+11 90,11% 
 1948 151,161103 13,08%  1987 3,03759E+11 131,35% 
 1949 198,0406386 31,01%  1988 1,3455E+12 342,95% 
 1950 248,766328 25,61%  1989 4,27794E+13 3079,44% 
 1951 339,9854862 36,67% Menem 1990 1,03268E+15 2313,96% 
 1952 471,4804064 38,68%  1991 2,80549E+15 171,67% 
 1953 490,3483309 4,00%  1992 3,50406E+15 24,90% 
 1954 508,8534107 3,77%  1993 3,87589E+15 10,61% 
 1955 571,6255443 12,34%  1994 4,0378E+15 4,18% 
Arambru 1956 648,3309144 13,42%  1995 4,17412E+15 3,38% 
 1957 808,7082729 24,74%  1996 4,18062E+15 0,16% 
Frondizi 1958 1064,586357 31,64%  1997 4,20272E+15 0,53% 
 1959 2272,859216 113,50%  1998 4,24158E+15 0,92% 
 1960 2878,809869 26,66% De la Rúa 1999 4,1921E+15 -1,17% 
 1961 3274,310595 13,74%  2000 4,15273E+15 -0,94% 
 1962 4127,721335 26,06% Saá 2001 4,10848E+15 -1,07% 
Guido 1963 5201,015965 26,00% Duhalde 2002 5,17128E+15 25,87% 
Illia 1964 6353,41074 22,16% Kirchner Mr. 2003 5,86647E+15 13,44% 
 1965 8173,439768 28,65%  2004 6,12553E+15 4,42% 
 1966 10776,48766 31,85%  2005 6,71618E+15 9,64% 
Ongania 1967 13918,72279 29,16%  2006 7,448E+15 10,90% 
 1968 16182,87373 16,27% Kirchner Ms. 2007 8,10593E+15 8,83% 
 1969 17409,28882 7,58%  2008 8,80177E+15 8,58% 
 1970 19767,77939 13,55%  2009 9,22928E+15 4,86% 
Laborda 1971 26625,54427 34,69%     
Lanusse 1972 42191,582 58,46%     
 1973 67656,02322 60,35% average price growth between 1960 and 
1974 
28,37% 
Peronism 1974 83976,77794 24,12%     
 1975 237590,7112 182,92%     
 1976 1292089,985 443,83%     
Military 1977 3568940,493 176,21%     
regime 1978 9843251,089 175,80%     
 1979 25515239,48 159,22%     
 1980 51240928,88 100,82%     
 1981 104731494,9 104,39%     
 1982 277358490,6 164,83%     
 1983 1230914369 343,80%     
Source: INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos) 
% in bold is when the inflation goes above 100% 
% in white is when the data that have been “corrupted” by the government 
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Annex 3: Monthly inflation index for drink and food from December 
2007 until now 
 
month index growth compared to the same month the year before average inflation for 2009
déc-07 101,47
janv-08 103,55
févr-08 108,14
mars-08 116,76
avr-08 116,54
mai-08 117,25
juin-08 119,32
juil-08 122,36
août-08 125,05
sept-08 126,27
oct-08 127,90
nov-08 126,24
déc-08 127,59 25,74% 12,30%
janv-09 126,15 21,82%
févr-09 124,95 15,54%
mars-09 126,76 8,56%
avr-09 132,20 13,43%
mai-09 131,87 12,47%
juin-09 132,58 11,12%
juil-09 133,81 9,36%
août-09 137,54 9,99%
sept-09 139,55 10,51%
oct-09 140,90 10,16%
Source: www.inflacionverdadera.com (The «calculations and statistical methodologies are based on 
INDEC officials, prior to the changes introduced by the current government.”) 
81 
Annex 4.a: PPP converted GDP (constant international), 1944-1950 
year GDP GDP growth
1944 4 579
1945 4 356 -4,86%
1946 4 665 7,09%
1947 5 089 9,10%
1948 5 252 3,19%
1949 5 047 -3,89%  
Source: Angus Maddison Time series 
Annex 4.b: PPP converted GDP, I$ in 2005 constant prices, 1950-2007 
 
year GDP GDP growth year GDP GDP growth
1950 7736,34 1979 12171,3 4,47%
1951 8004,03 3,46% 1980 12116,41 -0,45%
1952 7372,72 -7,89% 1981 11319,04 -6,58%
1953 7543,17 2,31% 1982 10867,21 -3,99%
1954 7661,55 1,57% 1983 11137,67 2,49%
1955 8072,9 5,37% 1984 11203,3 0,59%
1956 8098,13 0,31% 1985 10410,47 -7,08%
1957 8299,75 2,49% 1986 10832,22 4,05%
1958 8714,95 5,00% 1987 10892,32 0,55%
1959 8125,52 -6,76% 1988 10562,62 -3,03%
1960 8814,7 8,48% 1989 9833,95 -6,90%
1961 8962,03 1,67% 1990 9445,76 -3,95%
1962 8903,85 -0,65% 1991 10109,42 7,03%
1963 8480,73 -4,75% 1992 10905,66 7,88%
1964 8966,91 5,73% 1993 11471,77 5,19%
1965 9691,08 8,08% 1994 11912,96 3,85%
1966 9577,82 -1,17% 1995 11709,23 -1,71%
1967 9707,56 1,35% 1996 12118,01 3,49%
1968 10048,18 3,51% 1997 12778,25 5,45%
1969 10753,23 7,02% 1998 13132,14 2,77%
1970 10926,52 1,61% 1999 12717,35 -3,16%
1971 11139,3 1,95% 2000 12518,49 -1,56%
1972 11102,71 -0,33% 2001 12066,74 -3,61%
1973 11262,51 1,44% 2002 11273,66 -6,57%
1974 11757,83 4,40% 2003 11951,11 6,01%
1975 11479,26 -2,37% 2004 12647,79 5,83%
1976 11499,55 0,18% 2005 13603,17 7,55%
1977 12101,97 5,24% 2006 14495,78 6,56%
1978 11650,47 -3,73% 2007 15274,68 5,37%  
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Centre for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 
2009. 
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Annex 5: Fiscal deficit (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
year fiscal deficit year fiscal deficit year fiscal deficit year fiscal deficit 
1945 4,60% 1962 7,18% 1979 5,57% 1996 3,16% 
1946 6,90% 1963 6,48% 1980 6,48% 1997 1,50% 
1947 5,80% 1964 6,20% 1981 11,27% 1998 2,42% 
1948 13,40% 1965 3,86% 1982 11,36% 1999 4,51% 
1949 9,80% 1966 4,72% 1983 10,38% 2000 3,30% 
1950 5,50% 1967 2,02% 1984 8,73% 2001 7,03% 
1951 4,50% 1968 2,18% 1985 4,95% 2002 0,81% 
1952 5,60% 1969 1,73% 1986 4,09% 2003 -1,59% 
1953 8,80% 1970 1,87% 1987 7,04% 2004 -3,54% 
1954 8,50% 1971 4,40% 1988 7,93% 2005 -1,01% 
1955 6,90% 1972 5,90% 1989 7,81% 2006 -1,41% 
1956 5,00% 1973 7,49% 1990 4,73% 2007 -0,62% 
1957 5,50% 1974 7,75% 1991 1,42% 2008 -0,44% 
1958 9,60% 1975 13,84% 1992 0,45%   
1959 2,90% 1976 10,26% 1993 0,01%   
1960 2,70% 1977 3,96% 1994 1,67%   
1961 4,04% 1978 5,22% 1995 2,89%   
Source: (Di Tella, et al., 1989) table 15-6, p330 for years 1945 to 1961 
 Report from the Ministerio de Economia y Producion, Secretaria de Hacienda, 2004 p. 12 for years 
1961 to 2004 
Ministerio de Economica y producion, Secretaria de hacienda, website for years 2005 and 2006 
CEPAL for year 2007 and 2008. (Note: these numbers only correspond to the central government 
deficit. Data for the rest of the public sector is 
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Annex 6: Annual exchange rate, number of peso units per US Dollar 
(end of period) 
 
year Peso Moneda Nacional (PMN) year Peso Ley (PL) year Peso Argentino (PA) year Australes (A) year acutal Peso (P)
1949 10 1970 4 1983 23,261 1986 1,257 1992 0,9905
1950 10 1971 5 1984 178,7 1987 3,75 1993 0,9985
1951 10 1972 5 1985 800,5 1988 13,37 1994 0,9995
1952 10 1973 5 1989 1795 1995 1
1953 10 1974 5 1990 5585 1996 0,9995
1954 10 1975 60,9 1991 9985 1997 0,9995
1955 40 1976 274,5 1998 0,9995
1956 40 1977 597,5 1999 0,9995
1957 40 1978 1003,5 2000 0,9995
1958 70 1979 1618,5 2001 0,9995
1959 80 1980 1993 2002 3,32
1960 80 1981 7248 2003 2,9
1961 80 1982 48545 2004 2,959
1962 130 2005 3,01
1963 130 2006 3,04
1964 150 2007 3,12
1965 190 2008 3,43
1966 250 2009 3,8
1967 350
1968 350
1969 350
Sources: International financial Yearbooks of 1979, 1998 and 2009 (IMF) 
Summary of the different currencies and their values: 
-1945 to 1969: Peso Moneda Nacional (PMN) 
-1970 to 1983: Peso Ley (PL) 
1 PL = 100 PMN 
-1983 to 1985: Peso Argentino (PA) 
1 PA = 10000 PL 
-1985 to 1991: Austral (A) 
1 A = 1000 PA 
-1992 to now: Peso (P) 
1 P = 10000 A 
1P = 1013 PMN 
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Annex 7: Current Account Balance (in millions of US dollars) 
year 
current account 
balance year 
current account 
balance 
1945 368 1978 1856 
1946 425 1979 -513 
1947 -29 1980 -4774 
1948 54 1981 -4712 
1949 -138 1982 -2353 
1950 112 1983 -2436 
1951 311 1984 -2495 
1952 -465 1985 -952 
1953 344 1986 -2859 
1954 83 1987 -4235 
1955 -242 1988 -1572 
1956 -131 1989 -1305 
1957 -303 1990 4552 
1958 -259 1991 -647 
1959 11 1992 -5462 
1960 -204 1993 -7672 
1961 -585 1994 -10118 
1962 -273 1995 -2768 
1963 234 1996 -6770 
1964 36 1997 -12138 
1965 222 1998 -14482 
1966 259 1999 -11943 
1967 130 2000 -8981 
1968 -53 2001 -3780 
1969 -230 2002 8767 
1970 -163 2003 8140 
1971 -390 2004 3212 
1972 -227 2005 5275 
1973 711 2006 7709 
1974 118 2007 7103 
1975 -1287 2008 7588 
1976 651 2009  
1977 1126   
Source: (Di Tella, et al., 1989) for years 1945 to 1950 
International financial statistic yearbook from 1983, 1991 and 2009 (IMF) for years 1950 to 2009 
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Annex 8: Historical Summary 
Year president inflation Per capita 
GDP growth 
Exchange rate 
system 
Current 
account 
 
 +      more than 
20% 
++    more than 
100% 
+++ more than 
1000% 
- negative 
growth 
+ positive 
growth 
 -deficit 
+ 
surplus 
1945 
Gral. Juan D. 
Perón  
  Multiple fixed + 
1946   +  + 
1947   +  - 
1948   +  + 
1949  + -  - 
1950  + -  + 
1951  + +  + 
1952  + -  - 
1953   +  + 
1954   +  + 
1955 
Gral. Eduardo 
Lonardi67/Gral. 
Pedro E. 
Aramburu 
 +  - 
1956   +  - 
1957  + +  - 
1958 Dr Arturo Frondizi + +  - 
1959  ++ -  + 
1960  + + Dirty float - 
1961   + Fixed - 
1962 
Dr Jose Maria 
Guido 
+ - Flexible - 
1963 Dr Arturo Illia + -  + 
1964  + +  + 
1965  + +  + 
1966 
Gral. Juan C. 
Ongania 
+ -  + 
1967  + + Fixed + 
1968   +  - 
1969   +  - 
1970 
Gral. Roberto M. 
Levingston 
 +  - 
1971 
Gral. Alejandro 
Lanusse 
+ +  - 
1972  + +  - 
1973 
Dr Hector 
Campora67/Mr. 
+ +  + 
                                                      
67
 Only stayed for a few months and was replaced in the same year-+ 
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Raul Lastiri67/Gral. 
Juan D. Perón 
1974 Mrs. Isabel Peron + +  + 
1975  ++ -  - 
1976 
Gral. Jorge R. 
Videla  
++ -  + 
1977  ++ +  + 
1978 
 ++ - Exchange rate 
table 
+ 
1979  ++ +  - 
1980  ++ -  - 
1981 
Gral. Roberto 
Viola67/ Gral. 
Leopoldo Galtieri 
++ - Flexible - 
1982 
Gral. Reynaldo 
Bignone 
++ -  - 
1983 Dr Raul R. Alfonsin ++ +  - 
1984  ++ +  - 
1985 
 ++ - Attempts to 
fixe 
- 
1986  + +  - 
1987  ++ +  - 
1988  ++ -  - 
1989 
Dr Carlos S. 
Menem 
+++ -  - 
1990  +++ -  - 
1991  ++ +  + 
1992 
 + + currency 
board 
- 
1993   +  - 
1994   +  - 
1995   -  - 
1996   +  - 
1997   +  - 
1998   +  - 
1999 
Dr Fernando de la 
Rúa 
 -  - 
2000   -  - 
2001 Adolfo R. Saá  - flexible - 
2002 
Dr Eduardo A. 
Duhalde 
+ -  + 
2003 
Dr Néstor C. 
Kirchner 
 +  + 
2004     + 
2005     + 
2006     + 
2007 
Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner  
   + 
2008     + 
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Annex 9: Table of social variables 
year 
crude 
marriage 
rate 
(1) 
real wages 
index 
(2) 
unemployment 
rate 
(3) 
employment 
rate 
(4) 
Wage 
Share 
(5) 
Labor 
productivity 
(6) 
1945 8 66,3 
    1946 8 64,1 
    1947 8,7 78,3 
    1948 8,4 92,5 
    1949 8,4 93,3 
    1950 8,3 86,7 
    1951 8,1 82 
    1952 7,6 75,7 
    1953 7,8 79,6 
    1954 7,7 86,9 
    1955 7,5 84,5 
    1956 7,4 90,6 
    1957 7,5 87,3 
    1958 7,4 96,8 
    1959 7,3 74,2 
    1960 7 74,5 
    1961 6,8 82,7 
    1962 6,5 81,7 
    1963 6,1 81,7 
    1964 6,9 90,2 
    1965 6,9 98,4 8,8 
   1966 6,7 98,9 7,1 
   1967 6,6 96,7 5,6 
   1968 6,6 91,7 6,1 
   1969 
 
96,4 6,5 
   1970 7,3 100 5,1 
   1971 
 
105,2 4,5 
   1972 
 
99 5 
   1973 
 
107,2 5,9 
   1974 
 
126,4 6,6 39,2 554,84 5332536,25 
1975 
 
123,7 5,5 38,4 1556,43 5368463,06 
1976 
 
79,2 4,20 37,4 559,47 5477673,56 
1977 7 75,6 3,65 37,5 25,37 5778696,39 
1978 
 
77,2 4,80 37,7 20,22 5472331,11 
1979 
 
86,1 3,30 37,4 44,01 5887692,11 
1980 
 
100 3,25 37,4 64,14 5937267,80 
1981 5,6 90,29503106 2,50 36,6 75,24 6009417,01 
1982 
 
78,10559006 2,55 36,3 112,09 5854216,20 
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(continued) 
year 
crude 
marriage 
rate 
(1) 
real wages 
index 
(2) 
unemployment 
rate 
(3) 
employment 
rate 
(4) 
Wage 
Share 
(5) 
Labor 
productivity 
(6) 
1983 6 89,67391304 4,75 35,6 51,65 6196857,68 
1984 
 
111,6459627 5,30 36,1 16,24 6242121,60 
1985 
 
104,4254658 4,70 35,7 7,87 5884728,94 
1986 
 
104,1149068 4,55 36,5 4,59 6152896,60 
1987 
 
93,94409938 6,10 36,9 28,64 6224809,46 
1988 
 
90,83850932 5,55 36,6 140,70 6142306,97 
1989 
 
73,52484472 5,85 37,0 50,04 5742533,80 
1990 5,8 76,94099379 6,30 36,7 1,93 5781527,20 
1991 
 
78,02795031 7,60 36,1 0,30 6461780,33 
1992 
 
79,03726708 7,45 37,0 5,86 6881205,47 
1993 
 
77,95031056 6,45 37,3 662,29 7218238,44 
1994 
 
78,49378882 6,95 37,3 10504,32 7811574,76 
1995 4,6 77,63975155 9,60 36,3 52720,08 7771919,22 
1996 4,2 78,10559006 11,40 35,3 173646,70 8324514,68 
1997 
 
78,33850932 17,50 34,7 6150887,57 9147213,16 
1998 
 
78,33850932 17,20 34,3 46110849,06 9681658,76 
1999 4 80,66770186 14,90 35,0 12543580,80 9168020,96 
2000 3,8 82,45341615 12,93 36,8 -5875015,48 8634027,94 
2001 3,5 81,90993789 14,27 36,5 4949505,97 8293845,87 
2002 3,2 70,49689441 15,05 36,2 4654868,43 7447329,25 
2003 3,4 69,40993789 17,35 35,2 -181162,22 8336968,33 
2004 3,4 
 
19,65 34,1 
  2005 3,4 
 
15,40 36,2 
  2006 3,5 
 
13,63 
   2007 3,5 
 
11,58 
   2008 
  
10,20 
   2009 
  
8,60 
    
       (1): number of legal marriages performed and registered per 1000 of the population 
Source: demographic yearbooks, United Nations 
(2): real wages index (1970=100) 
Source: (Sommavilla, 1996) for years 1945 to 1980; ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean for the rest 
(3) Percentage of unemployed persons in the active population 
Source: (Sommavilla, 1996) for years 1963 to 1971; INDEC, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua. 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos) for the rest 
(4) Percentage of employed persons in the active population  
Source: INDEC, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua 
(5) Wage share (ws)= (real wages * employment rate)/(consumer prices * GDP) 
(6)Labor productivity= GDP/employment 
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Annex 10: Dummy variables for inflation stabilization policies 
year 
stabilization 
policy 
 (STAB) 
exchange rate 
policy 
 (XRpol) 
Fiscal 
policy 
(FDpol) 
Monetary 
policy 
(IRpol) 
price 
control 
(Pcontrol) 
wage 
control 
(Wcontrol) 
1945 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1946 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1947 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1948 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1949 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1950 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1951 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1952 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1953 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1954 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1955 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1956 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1957 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1958 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1959 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1960 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1961 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1963 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1964 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1965 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1967 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 1 1 1 0 0 1 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90 
year 
stabilization 
policy (STAB) 
exchange rate 
policy (XRpol) 
Fiscal 
policy 
(FDpol) 
Monetary 
policy 
(IRpol) 
price 
control 
(Pcontrol) 
wage 
control 
(Wcontrol) 
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1988 1 0 1 1 1 1 
1989 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Zusammenfassung 
           Seit mehr als sechzig Jahren leidet Argentinien an einer sehr hohen 
Inflationsrate und instabilen Regierungen. Alles Mögliche wurde schon versucht um 
Inflation in den Griff zu bekommen aber bis heute zeichnet sich keine langfristige 
Lösung für das Problem ab. Die Peronistische Zeit und Diktaturen verarmten das Land, 
welches seit langem eine hohe Arbeitslosigkeit ertragen muss.  
             Die neue Keynesianische Phillips Kurve ist ein gutes Modell, um die Beziehung 
zwischen Inflation und Grenzkosten zu überprüfen. Vier verschiedene Variablen 
wurden genutzt, um diese Grenzkosten gut umzufassen: Arbeitslosigkeit, der Output 
Gap, die Lohnquote und die Arbeitsproduktivität. Durch die generalisierte 
Momenten-Methode und verschieden Instrumenten wie der verzögerten Inflation 
aus Vorperiode, Heiratsquote oder Lohninflation, wurde eine positive Korrelation 
zwischen Inflation und Arbeitslosigkeit gefunden. Eine Erhöhung von Inflation führt zu 
einer Erhöhung von Arbeitslosigkeit. In dieselbe Richtung, zeigten die Resultate eine 
positive Beziehung von Preiswachstum und Arbeitsproduktivität aber eine negative 
Beziehung mit dem Output Gap und der Lohnquote.  Normalerweiser, also, hätte mit 
einer Inflation Stabilisierungspolitik die Arbeitslosigkeit sinken sollen, so wie auch die 
Arbeitsproduktivität und hätte die Lohnquote und der Output Gap zunehmen sollen. 
Leider, laut Modell, ist das nicht der Fall. Die Regierung schaffte es nicht einmal die 
Inflation selber zu kontrollieren oder nur sehr kurzfristig und dann ist sie meistens 
noch höher gestiegen als vorher. 
             Wenn man die Ergebnisse mit anderen Ländern des Latein-Amerikanischen 
Kontinents vergleicht, findet man keine Einheit. Während die am meist entwickelten 
Länder eine positive Korrelation zwischen Inflationsquote mit der Lohnquote haben. 
Das ist genau das Gegenteil in Argentinien. Dies könnte ein Hindernis für die 
argentinische Politik Effizienz gewesen sein. In der Tat haben seine wichtigsten 
Handelspartner eine gegenteilige Phillips Beziehung und eine koordinierte Politik 
wäre unmöglich. 
             Die Ergebnisse von der Neuen Keynesianische Phillips Kurve scheinen schwach 
zu sein für Argentinien, wegen der Lücke an Daten und weil sie sehr von der Wahl 
Instrumente die gewählt wurden wie die generalisierte Momenten-Methode 
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abhängen. Weitere Studien und Befragungen wären notwendig, um diese Beziehung 
genauer zu überprüfen.  
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Abstract 
             For more than sixty years Argentina has suffered from very high inflation and 
government instability. The authorities have tried several different policies to bring 
inflation down but up to now there has been no long-term efficient inflation 
stabilization policy. Peronist periods and dictatorships impoverished the society 
which has for a long time experienced a very high unemployment rate.  
             The new Keynesian Phillips curve is a good model to examine the relationship 
between inflation and marginal cost. Four different variables were used to define the 
marginal cost: the unemployment rate, the output gap, the wage share and labor 
productivity. With the generalized method of moments and different instruments 
such as lagged inflation, the marriage rate and wage inflation, a positive correlation 
was found between inflation and unemployment. The first conclusion from the 
analysis is that an increase of inflation leads to an increase in unemployment. 
Additional results show a positive relationship between inflation and labor 
productivity and a negative relationship between inflation and the output gap and 
the wage rate. Normally, therefore, inflation stabilization policies should have 
brought down unemployment, while increasing labor productivity, the wage share 
and the output gap. Unfortunately, according to the model, this is not the case. The 
government didn’t even manage to decrease inflation or at best only in the very short 
term, with inflation usually returning after some time, often at even higher rates.  
             Comparing the results with those from other Latin America countries reveals 
no consistency across countries, while in  developed countries the inflation rate tends 
to be positively correlated with the wage rate, which is exactly the opposite to what 
was found for Argentina. This could have been an obstacle for Argentina’s policy 
efficiency. In fact, its main trade partner have opposite Phillips relationship and a 
coordinated policy would be impossible. 
             The results of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve appear to be weak for 
Argentina, partly because of the lack of appropriate data and because the results are 
sensitive to the choice of instruments chosen for the generalized moments method. 
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Further studies and surveys would be needed to examine this relationship in more 
detail.   
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